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 1. Donald Trump, commenting during the 2016 Republican presidential 
primaries on his proposed cuts to the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
budget. See Kyle Feldscher, Trump Says He’d Eliminate ‘Department of Envi-
ronment Protection,’ WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-says-hed-eliminate-department-of 
-environment-protection/article/2584908. 
 696 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:695 
 
  INTRODUCTION   
Calls to cut regulatory-agency budgets have rung through 
the halls of the Capitol and statehouses continuously for well 
over three decades.2 They have never resonated more loudly 
than in the 2016 presidential election.3 The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) has been a favorite target, with Congress 
trying to restrain its activities both by legislation and, less di-
rectly, by reducing the agency’s resources.4 As one would expect, 
interest groups fall on both sides of the fence when budget cuts 
are in the air. Pro-regulatory interests generally warn of dire 
consequences for the public. The Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC) decried EPA’s budget reductions in 2011 as “a 
contract on America masquerading as a spending bill. It’s noth-
ing short of a declaration of war on our most basic health protec-
tions. It would do away with fundamental safeguards that keep 
our air, water and lands clean.”5 The Center for Effective Gov-
ernment similarly assailed Congress’s proposed EPA budget for 
2015: 
 
 2. See, e.g., Clinton Takes Aim at Bureaucracy, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 11, 1993), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-02-11/news/9303177668_1_cuts 
-committees-and-subcommittees-congressional-leaders; Mark Landler & Annie 
Lowry, Obama Bid to Cut the Government Tests Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/us/politics/obama-to-ask-congress 
-for-power-to-merge-agencies.html; Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Governor Orders 
Agencies To Prepare for Budget Cuts, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www 
.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/26/oklahoma-governor-orders-agencies-to 
-prepare-for-b. 
 3. See, e.g., Gary Fineout, Jeb Bush Vows to Cut Spending, Lobbying, BOS. 
GLOBE (July 21, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/07/20/bush 
-vows-cut-spending-washington-lobbing/1Hk9xP6IPBjfH52DVImySN/story 
.html; Heather Haddon, Donald Trump Vows To Slash Funding for Education, 
EPA, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald 
-trump-vows-to-slash-funding-for-education-epa-1452551107. 
 4. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Faces Bigger Tasks, Smaller Budgets 
and Louder Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), http://nytimes.com/2016/03/19/ 
us/politics/epa-faces-bigger-tasks-smaller-budgets-and-louder-critics.html; 
Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, E.P.A. and Public Broadcasting Are on 
House Republicans’ List for Deep Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/us/politics/12congress.html; Janet Hook et al., GOP 
Wins Deep Cuts in Environment Spending, WALL STREET J., Apr. 13, 2011, at 
A4. 
 5. House Panel’s Spending Bill Threatens Public Health Protections, 
NRDC (July 6, 2011), http://www.nrdc.org/media/2011/110706. As Joel Mintz 
has concluded, “any form of budget cutting in EPA’s severely understaffed en-
forcement program is likely to have an adverse effect on the robustness and 
effectiveness of the Agency’s critical enforcement work.” Joel Mintz, Cutting 
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  In a continuing effort to dismantle the ability of the [EPA] to protect 
public health and the environment, Congress is poised to adopt a fiscal 
year 2015 budget that would reduce the agency’s funding for the fifth 
year in a row. The $60 million cut in EPA’s budget, which builds on 
previous reductions, will bring the agency’s staffing to its lowest level 
since 1989. These funding cuts are not surprising, given that anti-reg-
ulatory forces in Congress have made clear their intent to use the 
budget process to block EPA’s work.6 
There is no question that budget-cutting initiatives, 
whether aimed at specific agencies or the regulatory state in gen-
eral, have gone far beyond rhetoric to impose real impacts on 
agency resources. For example, the Obama Administration ac-
quiesced to significant personnel cuts in 2013 and 2014 as part 
of the broader sequestration initiative across government agen-
cies.7 The long-term trends in EPA personnel and inflation-ad-
justed budget tracked in Chart 1 show a generally static or 
slightly falling level of total resources from 1990 through 2013, 
with diminishing resources dominating the picture since 1998.8 
The EPA’s experience matches a history of similar declines in 
other agencies.9 
 
EPA’s Enforcement Budget: What It Might Mean, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE RE-
FORM: CPRBLOG (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.progressivereform.org/ 
CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=A6A2E941-98B3-8007-9CEEB42458BED78E. 
 6. Ronald White, Congress Slashes EPA Budget Again Despite Strong Pub-
lic Support for Strengthening Health Protections, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T 
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/blog/congress-slashes-epa 
-budget-again-despite-strong-public-support-strengthening-health-protection. 
 7. See Andy Medici, Government Cuts 84,500 Federal Employees in Three 
Years, FED. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.federaltimes.com/management/ 
leadership/2015/01/20/government-cuts-84500-federal-employees-in-three 
-years; Matthew Yglesias, The Idiocy of Sequestration, SLATE (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2013/01/what_is_ 
sequestration_the_budget_cuts_will_slam_government_spending_yet.html. 
 8. CHRISTOPHER SELLERS ET AL., ENVTL. DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIA-
TIVE, PT. 1, THE EPA UNDER SIEGE: TRUMP’S ASSAULT IN HISTORY AND TESTI-
MONY 23–24 (2017), https://envirodatagov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
06/Part-1-EPA-Under-Siege.pdf; see EPA’s Budget and Spending, EPA, https:// 
www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (reporting EPA’s 
budget and spending data). 
 9. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
budget decreased six percent from 2002 to 2012 (when adjusted for inflation). 
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42542, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT (HUD): FUNDING TRENDS SINCE FY2002, at 1 (2016), http://www 
.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42542.html. The Department of Interior ’s work-
force shrunk 8.2% from 2006 to 2015; the Department of Agriculture’s workforce 
shrunk 8.7% from 2006 to 2015. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., SIZING UP 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: FISCAL YEAR 2015 tbl.3 (2016). 
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Chart 1: EPA Budget and Employees 1991–2013 
 
The charge by the NRDC and Center for Effective Govern-
ment is straightforward: limiting EPA’s resources will make it 
less effective and, as a result, will worsen the pollution of our air, 
water, and lands.10 The connections are easy to draw. It seems 
intuitive that reducing resources means fewer personnel and in-
spections for compliance monitoring, fewer enforcement actions, 
less deterrent effect, and therefore more violations that harm the 
environment.11 It means fewer resources for permitting, drafting 
new regulations, and revising existing regulations. Indeed, ac-
cording to the Center for Effective Government, EPA’s strategic 
plan to balance its budget in 2014 called for a forty to fifty per-
cent reduction in inspection and enforcement cases.12 One might 
call this future an Age of Austerity, one of doing less with less. 
 
 10. As former EPA Deputy Administrator, Bob Perciasepe, describes, 
“EPA’s budget in 1990 for example was $5.5 billion and that would be $10.1 
[b]illion in 2016 with inflation to just do the same work. EPA[’]s 2016 budget is 
$8.1 [b]illion and that includes implementing the Safe Drinking Water Act and 
the Food Quality Protection acts in 1996 and the new TSCA [Toxic Substances 
Control Act] this year. EPA had 16,300 employees in 1990 and they have 15,300 
in 2016.” E-mail from Bob Perciasepe, President, Ctr. for Climate & Energy 
Sols., to authors (Oct. 16, 2016, 16:02 PDT) (on file with authors). 
 11. See Joel A. Mintz, “Running on Fumes”: The Development of New EPA 
Regulations in an Era of Scarcity, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10510, 10511–12 (2016). 
 12. White, supra note 6. 
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There is, however, a competing narrative. Terry Anderson, 
the noted “free market environmentalist,”13 argues that “if law-
makers are looking for an agency in which to cut spending with-
out causing harm to the environment, the EPA is a great place 
to start.”14 Anderson and others championing agency budget 
cuts defend their actions as trimming fat from the bureau-
cracy.15 This was one of the central themes behind Congress’s 
haircut strategy of sequestration—cutting equal amounts from 
all agencies.16 Increasing agency budgets is far more likely, they 
imply, to promote bureaucracy than improvements in regulatory 
outcomes, such as environmental quality in EPA’s case. This 
strategy centers on doing more with less. 
Which narrative is accurate—will budget cuts harm envi-
ronmental quality or have no impact? To bolster his side of the 
argument, Anderson graphed EPA’s inflation-adjusted budget 
against measures of air quality for selected pollutants, shown in 
Chart 2 below.17 Despite a flat or declining budget, Anderson’s 
chart shows air quality steadily improving over three decades. 
This is not what one would expect from the doing less with less 
dystopia. 
 
 13. Terry Anderson, PROP. & ENVTL. RES. CTR. (PERC), www.perc.org/staff/ 
terry-anderson (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
 14. Terry Anderson, EPA Budget Cuts: Reducing Bureaucracy, Not Envi-
ronmental Quality, PERC: THE PERCOLATOR, http://www.perc.org/blog/epa 
-budget-cuts-reducing-bureaucracy-not-environmental-quality (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2017) [hereinafter EPA Budget Cuts]. 
 15. See id. (“Such data suggest that increasing the EPA's budget . . . will 
only increase bureaucracy, not air quality.”). 
 16. See Jonathan Weisman, Answers to Questions on Capital’s Top Topic, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/us/politics/ 
questions-and-answers-about-the-sequester.html. 
 17. EPA Budget Cuts, supra note 14. 
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Chart 2: Air Quality and EPA Budget 
 
The explanation for Anderson’s chart—why steady and de-
clining agency resources appear to correlate with clear and con-
tinuous improvements in air quality—is far from obvious. To be 
sure, all the chart shows is a correlation, and environmental pol-
icy experts no doubt could offer alternative causal explanations. 
Perhaps the reductions in pollutants would have been even more 
rapid had EPA been provided more resources. Perhaps EPA in-
ternally allocated more resources to air quality while other envi-
ronmental quality goals, such as protection of drinking water, 
suffered by comparison. One could even argue that the chart, ra-
ther than proving EPA is a bloated agency, actually shows EPA 
is quite effective, continuing to knock down air pollution levels 
while receiving no additional or even fewer resources. Or per-
haps EPA’s budget does not matter so much after all. To know 
which of these very different explanations is most on target 
turns on one fundamental question: What is the relationship be-
tween the funding levels provided to regulatory agencies and the 
social-welfare outcomes they are charged with delivering? 
The crux of that question—how does more or less funding 
move the needle on outcomes—is asked and answered routinely 
throughout the private sector. Every budget cycle, companies 
must determine how most effectively to allocate their funds to 
grow the bottom line. Managers must decide whether to increase 
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budgets for research and development (R&D) and manufactur-
ing, for example, or decrease for marketing. Similar questions 
about the dynamic linkage between funding and outcomes also 
lie at the core of research into most fields of social importance. 
What is the relationship between police funding and crime? How 
does health care spending influence medical outcomes? What is 
the significance of school funding on test scores? In these sectors 
and many others, researchers devote a great deal of time and 
effort to examining the relationship between resources and re-
sults.18 Yet virtually no research has considered this relation-
ship in the context of regulatory agencies. 
The most basic question about agency resources and out-
comes—are we getting what we pay for?—remains informed 
largely by anecdotes and political sound bites. Leading Republi-
can candidates during the 2016 presidential primaries repeat-
edly denounced regulatory agencies, with Donald Trump calling 
for dramatic reduction of EPA’s budget and Ted Cruz promising 
to eliminate four cabinet agencies were he to become president.19 
Democratic candidates ridiculed their proposals.20 But neither 
side offered any robust evidence of what would happen to regu-
latory outcomes if funding were to move in either direction. 
To take the example of EPA, do greater EPA resources actu-
ally lead to better environmental protection efforts? If so, to what 
extent do these regulatory efforts then lead to improved environ-
mental quality in the field? Is the converse true, with reduced 
resources leading to poorer environmental quality? Which as-
pects of environmental quality are most at risk from reduced 
EPA resources and which are less vulnerable to backsliding? 
 
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. Igor Bobic, Donald Trump Would Cut Department of Education, EPA, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald 
-trump-epa-education_us_56240035e4b02f6a900cc0e7; Oliver Milman, Repub-
lican Candidates’ Calls To Scrap EPA Met with Skepticism by Experts, GUARD-
IAN (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/feb/ 
26/republican-candidates-donald-trump-eliminate-epa-law-experts; see Amber 
Phillips, Four Federal Agencies President Ted Cruz Could Do Without, WASH. 
POST (July 24, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/07/ 
24/four-federal-agencies-president-ted-cruz-could-do-without/z?utm_term= 
.4aa88982a5f5. 
 20. See, e.g., Evan Lehmann, Trump, Clinton Argue over Climate Change, 
SCI. AM. (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump 
-clinton-argue-over-climate-change. 
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We focus on EPA in this Article because it has a clear over-
arching agency goal—environmental protection—that is meas-
urable.21 Our findings, however, are broadly applicable across 
the administrative state. The empirical questions we address 
have important theoretical and practical implications for all reg-
ulatory agencies. Indeed, these implications are heightened, 
given the antiregulatory stance of the Trump administration.22 
 Moreover, these questions will become increasingly im-
portant, no matter who occupies the White House.23 They de-
serve serious study, not the current state of sweeping ideological 
claims from politicians and interest groups on both sides of the 
debate. But how would one go about addressing these questions? 
That is the ambitious aim of this Article. 
This Article lays the groundwork for a new field of theoreti-
cal and empirical research, using what we call the “regulatory 
production function,” to understand more clearly the effects of 
incremental changes (reductions or increases) in regulatory-
agency budgets on the levels of benefits they produce. To ensure 
our theory is grounded, we present a case study using EPA as 
the regulatory agency and environmental quality as the targeted 
social welfare outcome. But our theoretical framework and em-
pirical findings have important implications across the regula-
tory state on the relationship between agency funding and out-
comes for public health, safety, and welfare agencies. 
 
 21. While the data on agency performance are hardly plentiful at EPA, the 
data that EPA regularly compiles and makes available (at least for certain air 
pollutants) are superior to comparable information at other agencies. 
 22. For example, his nominee to head the Department of Energy, Rick 
Perry, had as a presidential candidate called for the elimination of the agency. 
See Coral Davenport, Rick Perry, Ex-Governor of Texas, Is Trump’s Pick as En-
ergy Secretary, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/ 
13/us/politics/rick-perry-energy-secretary-trump.html. 
 23. The simple math of discretionary spending means that money available 
for regulatory agencies will likely continue to be tight in the coming decades. 
Absent radical legislative reform, increases in future spending for Social Secu-
rity and Medicare are built-in. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MEDICARE-CON-
GRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE’S JUNE 2017 BASELINE 1 (2017), http://www 
.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51302-2017-06-medicare.pdf. There-
fore, for agency budgets to stay level, one of the following must occur: (1) an 
increase in federal revenues, which would likely require higher taxes; (2) an 
increase in deficits; (3) a fall in discretionary spending; or (4) some combination 
of the first three. Regardless of the exact combination, the likelihood of signifi-
cant increases in EPA’s and other regulatory agencies’ budgets seems low for 
the foreseeable future. 
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Part I opens by describing relevant scholarship on the rela-
tionship between government resources and outcomes, showing 
the paucity of theoretical and empirical analysis, particularly 
with respect to regulatory agencies. To begin to fill the theoreti-
cal void, Part II introduces the production function concept and 
how it can provide a framework to think more clearly about the 
linkages between agency funding and regulatory outcomes. To 
demonstrate the usefulness of the model, Part III uses it to de-
velop a set of hypotheses that could explain why EPA funding 
levels may or may not have a significant effect on environmental 
quality. Part IV introduces an empirical component, assessing 
what the available data can tell us about the relationship be-
tween agency funding and environmental benefits. Using regres-
sion analysis, we do not find statistically significant correlations 
between the EPA or state agency funding levels and air pollu-
tion, but major data constraints limit the strength of these anal-
yses. 
Part V then explores the important research questions that 
emerge from the regulatory production function model and our 
empirical findings. The administrative state has developed and 
come to rely heavily on sophisticated cost-benefit analysis for 
evaluating specific policy proposals. As valuable as it is for those 
purposes, cost-benefit analysis provides little insight into the 
complex budget-outcome relationship. A new mode of analysis is 
needed, and new forms of data, including comparative, time se-
ries, and experimental studies, must be compiled. With this in 
hand, a whole series of important research questions comes into 
focus. Consider the following, for example: 
(1) How would Congress or the agency know which are its 
 most cost-effective budget investments going forward, or 
 where to make the next round of cuts? 
(2) How should an agency manage its activities in an 
 extended period of austerity? 
(3) What role do resources play in maintaining agency 
 resilience and how can this be assessed? 
(4) Is there a difference as to how an agency might respond 
 to budget cuts compared to budget increases? 
(5) Are there other institutions, public or private, that could 
 provide more bang for the buck were funding diverted to 
 them from the incumbent agency? 
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These and related questions are of the first importance, yet can-
not be answered by current methods of analysis and data compi-
lations. Part V thus closes by setting forth the major components 
and approaches of a new analytic tool that will help inform 
agency-scale decisions regarding institutional design and instru-
ment choice. It also delineates the broader set of decisions re-
garding federalism and reliance on private governance as a sup-
plement to public authority. 
Decades ago, scholars proposed greater agency reliance on 
cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment to guide agency ac-
tions. At the time, this must have seemed ridiculously ambitious, 
given the complexity of the issues and the simplicity of the tools. 
Over time, however, these tools have been developed into im-
portant contributors to agency management. We argue that the 
regulatory production function should follow the same trajec-
tory. 
The relationship between agency resources and regulatory 
outcomes is fundamental and complex. It goes to the very heart 
of regulatory policy, which explains why politicians and interest 
groups take strong positions about how it works. Yet it remains 
woefully underdeveloped theoretically and understudied empir-
ically. This Article provides the first step in laying an intellec-
tual foundation to address these shortcomings and set out future 
avenues for research. 
I.  SCHOLARSHIP EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN AGENCY RESOURCES AND OUTCOMES   
As discussed in the Introduction, the relationship between 
public funding and outcomes has long been an active field of re-
search in a wide range of social sciences. For example, many 
scholars have examined the relationship between public spend-
ing on education and student academic achievement.24 The vast 
 
 24. See, e.g., ULRICH BOSER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RETURN ON EDUCA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT: 2014, at 1–2 (2014), http://cdn.americanprogress 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ROI-report.pdf (comparing academic achieve-
ment, as measured by the percentage of students scoring proficiently on state 
exams, with the educational spending of school districts, while controlling for 
factors including the cost of living and student poverty); ANDREW J. COULSON, 
CATO INST., STATE EDUCATION TRENDS: ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE AND SPEND-
ING OVER THE PAST 40 YEARS 1 (2014), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/ 
pubs/pdf/pa746.pdf (using a time-series regression approach to adjust state SAT 
score averages for factors including participation rate and student de-
mographics from 1972 to the present. The study then compares these adjusted 
SAT scores with the raw SAT scores and inflation-adjusted per-pupil spending 
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majority find that increasing educational spending does not, on 
its own, improve student achievement.25  Other research has fo-
cused on the relationship between police funding and crime 
rates. The findings have not been uniform, with some studies 
showing that crime rates are positively correlated with police 
funding (suggesting that higher crime rates trigger greater fund-
ing) and others that increases in police levels tend to reduce 
crime at the local level.26 Significant research efforts have also 
 
to examine the link between education funding and outcomes); Rob Greenwald, 
Larry V. Hedges & Richard D. Laine, The Effect of School Resources on Student 
Achievement, 66 REV. EDUC. RES. 361, 361 (1996) (analyzing a comprehensive 
collection of sixty school funding and achievement studies that have been per-
formed, and using combined significance analysis and effect magnitude estima-
tion to determine the relationship between three variables—public expendi-
tures (i.e., per-pupil spending), teacher background characteristics (e.g., 
certification, educational history, and ability), and class/school sizes—and the 
standardized test scores considered by the surveyed articles); Emiliana Vegas 
& Chelsea Coffin, When Education Expenditure Matters: An Empirical Analysis 
of Recent International Data, 59 COMP. EDUC. REV. 289, 291–95 (2015) (compar-
ing per capita GDP, per pupil educational spending, and learning outcomes, as 
measured by mean scores in mathematics and reading as reported by the Pro-
gram for International Student Assessment). 
 25. Instead of simply increasing aggregate funding, the studies suggest 
moderate increases in funding on specific resources could greatly improve stu-
dent achievement (such as reducing class sizes, school sizes, and improving the 
quality of teachers). For studies of school funding using a production function 
model, see infra note 62. 
 26. See Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Specification Problems, 
Police Levels, and Crime Rates, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 609, 623–24 (1996) (comparing 
the number of police employees around the country divided by population with 
crime rates for the seven crime types and finding it makes little difference 
whether police expenditures are considered in place of police employees because 
the two factors are strongly correlated and because the bulk of police expendi-
tures are for personnel); Thomas F. Pogue, Effect of Police Expenditures on 
Crime Rates: Some Evidence, 3 PUB. FIN. Q. 14, 15–17 (1975) (exploring the re-
lationship between public spending on law enforcement and the rate of criminal 
activity, as measured by the proportion of arrests to crime reported in the FBI’s 
index of serious crime, across metropolitan areas); Ben Vollaard & Joseph 
Hamed, Why the Police Have an Effect on Violent Crime After All: Evidence from 
the British Crime Survey, 55 J.L. & ECON. 901, 902–05 (2012) (exploring the 
relationship between police funding and crime in the U.K. by, first, assuming 
that police funding levels are tied to the crime rate, and then considering factors 
including: police funding, the number of police personnel, crime rates as rec-
orded by the police, and crime rates as deduced by police staffing and police 
funding levels); Ashish Yadav & Paul D. Berger, On the Relationship Between 
Police Funding and Crime Rates, 2 INT’L J. INNOVATION RES. 1, 2 (2015) (eval-
uating the link between police funding and crime by comparing the following 
factors across fifty small cities in the United States: total reported crime, re-
ported violent crime, annual police funding per resident, and educational at-
tainment of residents below and above age twenty-five). 
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addressed the relationship between health care spending and 
health outcomes. These studies tend to show that increasing 
public spending on healthcare improves quality of life by, for ex-
ample, reducing infant and childhood mortality. Some studies, 
though, find that differences between state expenditures on 
healthcare have little effect on infant mortality rates between 
different states.27  
Of course, there are important differences between direct 
funding of police, doctors, or teachers and funding a regulatory 
agency like EPA. Funding for EPA and other regulatory agencies 
has a less direct relationship to outcomes than do these other 
social-welfare funding programs. For example, many of the 
funds spent to produce improved environmental quality are 
spent not by EPA but by regulated parties as they invest labor 
and capital to comply with EPA mandates. EPA’s success thus 
depends in large part on how regulated parties behave.28 That 
said, it is reasonable to assume that agency resources matter at 
least to some degree in that regard. And the scale of agency re-
sources surely is meaningful outside the environmental field. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Occupational Safety 
 
 27. See Marwa Farag et al., Health Expenditures, Health Outcomes and the 
Role of Good Governance, 13 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 33, 33 (2013) 
(examining the relationship between public health spending and health out-
comes, including infant and child mortality, in 133 low- and middle-income 
countries for the years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2006); Richard Heijink, Xander 
Koolman & Gert P. Westert, Spending More Money, Saving More Lives? The 
Relationship Between Avoidable Mortality and Healthcare Spending in 14 
Countries, 14 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 527, 527 (2013) (comparing the growth of 
the proportion of healthcare spending to GDP with “avoidable mortality” in four-
teen western countries, based on data from 1996 to 2006); David R. Morgan & 
James T. LaPlant, The Spending-Service Connection: The Case of Health Care, 
24 POL’Y STUD. J. 215, 215 (1996) (exploring the relationship between public 
healthcare spending at the state and federal levels, various service measures 
(e.g., the quantity of hospital beds and full-time equivalent healthcare workers) 
and several health outcomes, including low infant birthweight, infant mortality, 
and childhood mortality); John Nixon & Philippe Ulmann, The Relationship Be-
tween Health Care Expenditure and Health Outcomes: Evidence and Caveats for 
a Causal Link, 7 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 7, 7 (2006) (analyzing the relationship 
between healthcare expenditures and health outcomes, including life expec-
tancy and infant mortality, for fifteen member-states of the European Union, 
relying on data from 1980 to 1995). 
 28. See, e.g., EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 
TO 1990, at 7 (1997) (estimating the private sector ’s total direct compliance costs 
of the Clean Air Act at nineteen billion dollars); EPA’s Budget and Spending, 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) 
(documenting EPA’s budget in 1990 at $5.46 billion). 
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and Health Administration (OSHA), Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA), Center for Disease Control (CDC), and a host of 
other regulatory bodies have strong mandates to protect the pub-
lic.29 How much their funding matters to providing these protec-
tions, therefore, ought to be a question of great interest to any-
one weighing in on the budgeting debate. 
Nevertheless, there have been few studies examining the 
practical impact of resource levels for regulatory agency out-
comes. Prominent exceptions include studies of funding for secu-
rities regulation30 and for OSHA regulation of the workplace.31 
It stands to reason that those and other regulatory agencies’ 
funding levels determine their effectiveness, but overall there 
has been strikingly little research examining the connection be-
tween agency resources and public health, safety, and welfare 
outcomes. This is most certainly true in the environmental field. 
 
 29. See, e.g., Safety: The Foundation of Everything We Do, FAA, http://www 
.faa.gov/about/safety_efficiency (last updated July 24, 2017) (“We continually 
strive to improve the safety and efficiency of flight in this country.”); What We 
Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo (last updated Apr. 4, 2017) 
(stating the “FDA is responsible for advancing the public health”); About OSHA, 
OSHA, https://www.osha.gov/about.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (stating 
OSHA “assure[s] safe and healthful working conditions for working men and 
women”). 
 30. In a comparative study across nations, Jackson and Roe found that 
agency resources (budget and staff ) are a better predictor of regulatory out-
comes than formal elements of regulation, arguing that increased public en-
forcement is an effective means of obtaining the market outcomes security reg-
ulators seek. Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement 
of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 207 (2009); 
see also James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heu-
ristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 742 (2003) (arguing that SEC 
resource limitations lead to insufficient enforcement); Jason Scott Johnston, A 
Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1343, 1362–63 (2002) (asserting that agency 
budget decreases will reduce regulatory capacity). 
 31. McGarity and Shapiro’s comprehensive analysis of OSHA inspections 
and workplace injuries concluded that OSHA inspections have had a greater 
impact on the injury rates of inspected firms and therefore that greater funding 
will increase workplace safety. They also cite an OSHA assertion that fifteen 
percent budget cuts would lead to an additional 50,000 workplace injuries and 
50,000 cases of occupational disease. Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, 
OSHA’s Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 597, 638 
(1996); see also SIDNEY SHAPIRO ET AL., REGULATORY DYSFUNCTION: HOW IN-
SUFFICIENT RESOURCES, OUTDATED LAWS, AND POLITICAL INTERFERENCE CRIP-
PLE THE ‘PROTECTOR AGENCIES’ 6 (Ctr. for Progressive Reform White Paper No. 
906 2009) (arguing that the CPSC was responsible for twenty-five percent drop 
in injuries caused by durable goods but following budget cuts in the Reagan 
years, injury rates leveled off ). 
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To be sure, regulatory agencies generate plenty of data. Tak-
ing EPA as a representative example, the agency provides a 
great deal of useful data about its work and about environmental 
quality. Annual reports are published on environmental quality 
indicators for air, water, and solid waste,32 as well as detailed 
data on inspections, enforcement actions, fines collected, tech-
nology mandated, and other sanctions.33 The Government Per-
formance and Results Act requires the EPA and other agencies 
to submit reports to Congress identifying goals and updates on 
how well it has achieved them.34 While providing an impressive 
stockpile of data, however, none of these reports assesses the re-
lationship between funding and outcomes. 
Nor have academics filled this gap. A small number of pub-
lications address aspects of this issue, but none get at the ques-
tion directly and comprehensively. At a macro level, for example, 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature has explored the 
relationship between GDP and common pollutants.35 
 
 32. See, e.g., Our Nation’s Air: Status and Trends Through 2016, EPA, 
http://gispub.epa.gov/air/trendsreport/2017/#home (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) 
(containing annual reports); Providing Safe Drinking Water in America: Na-
tional Public Water Systems Compliance Report, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/providing-safe-drinking-water-america-national-public-water 
-systems-compliance-report (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (containing annual re-
ports); EPA’s Report on Environment (ROE): Quantity of Municipal Solid Waste 
Generated and Managed, EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/roe/indicator.cfm?i=53 (last 
updated July 28, 2017) (containing annual report). 
 33. See Enforcement Annual Results for Fiscal Year 2016, EPA, http://www 
.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-fiscal-year-2016 (last up-
dated May 9, 2017). 
 34. See Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
62, § 1116, 107 Stat. 285, 288. “Departments and agencies must clearly describe 
the goals and objectives of their programs, identify resources and actions needed 
to accomplish these goals and objectives, develop a means of measuring their 
progress, and regularly report on their achievements.” Glossary of Terms: Gov-
ernment Performance and Results Act, EPA, https://rcrainfo.epa.gov/rcrainfo/ 
help/generalhelp/glossary_of_terms.htm#governmentperformance (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2017). EPA’s goals and assessments, though, are quite general. 
 35. Across a wide range of countries, research has shown that as societal 
wealth increases, there is an inflection point where pollutants decrease. The 
basic explanation is that environmental quality becomes a priority once more 
fundamental needs such as food and shelter have been met. This is an important 
insight as an economy-wide matter, but does not provide insight into agency 
funding. See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and 
the Environment, 110 Q.J. ECON. 353, 353 (1995); John A. List & Craig A. Gallet, 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Does One Size Fit All?, 31 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 409, 409 (1999). 
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There has also been a small number of more specific articles 
by economists and political scientists examining the connection 
between government size and air quality, the link between pub-
lic expenditures for social goods and air pollution levels, and the 
connections between state-level environmental expenditures 
and public-health outcomes, among others.36 
The most relevant contribution in legal scholarship is by 
Victor Flatt and Paul Collins. Focusing on the state level, they 
found that an increase in state environmental-agency enforce-
ment funding led to shorter periods of noncompliance under the 
Clean Air Act.37 They treated noncompliance as a proxy for en-
vironmental quality. While a useful study and the most rigorous 
examination of regulatory agency budget-outcome relationships 
to date, this does not answer our research question, for the sim-
ple reason that periods of noncompliance may have little impact 
on environmental quality.38 
 
 36. Bernauer and Koubi examined the connection between government size 
and air quality (as measured by sulfur dioxide concentrations) by surveying 
forty-two countries from 1971 to 1996. Thomas Bernauer & Vally Koubi, Are 
Bigger Governments Better Providers of Public Goods? Evidence from Air Pollu-
tion, 156 PUB. CHOICE 593, 604 (2013) (finding a positive correlation between a 
government’s size and air pollution). Islam and López looked at the link between 
public expenditures for social goods and air pollution levels. Asif M. Islam & 
Ramón E. López, Government Spending and Air Pollution in the US, 8 INT’L 
REV. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 139, 141 (2014) (finding that shifting public 
funding from private subsidies to social and public goods at the state level im-
proves air quality, whereas the same is not true at the federal level); see also 
SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE OF 
THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 203 (1996) (considering the relationship between state 
agency organizational form and water pollution levels); Alexander C. Heckman, 
Desperately Seeking Management: Understanding Management Quality and Its 
Impact on Government Performance Outcomes Under the Clean Air Act, 22 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 473, 487 (2012) (finding a statistically significant 
but “modest or negligible” impact from spending on environmental outcomes); 
Neal D. Woods, David M. Konisky & Ann O’M. Bowman, You Get What You Pay 
for: Environmental Policy and Public Health, 39 PUBLIUS 95, 103–04 (2009) 
(tracking state-level environmental expenditures to public-health outcomes for 
three years, finding that, all else being equal, states with stronger enforcement 
and more funding have lower levels of pollution and better public health, as 
shown by a composite measure of seventy environmental conditions). 
 37. Victor B. Flatt & Paul Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire 
Straits: There Is No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 55, 83 (2009). 
 38. It may well be the case, for example, that the noncompliance by some 
firms has only minimal impacts on air or water quality because other major 
emitters are in compliance. To assess the relationship between periods of non-
compliance and environmental quality, one would need to know more about 
which parties were in noncompliance and the resulting environmental impacts. 
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In short, while helpful in understanding specific aspects of 
government resources and environmental outcomes, none of 
these studies has focused on EPA budgeting and environmental 
quality, and studies looking more broadly at other regulatory 
agencies are few and far between. More fundamentally, no schol-
arly contributions from law, economics, political science, or other 
relevant disciplines have sought to develop a theoretical frame-
work for how one would approach studying the question for EPA 
or any other regulatory agency. We propose such a model in Part 
II.  
II.  BETWEEN AGENCY FUNDING AND OUTCOMES: 
MODELING THE REGULATORY PRODUCTION FUNCTION   
Terry Anderson’s macro analysis in Chart 2 found air qual-
ity improvements over an extended period of flat to declining 
EPA budgets.39 But what does that prove about the relationship 
between EPA’s budget and environmental quality? This is fun-
damentally a matter of understanding what happens between 
agency funding and intended outcomes. Yet, for the most part, 
the debate over EPA funding treats that space as a black box. 
To be sure, cost-benefit analysis of discrete EPA regulations 
and other actions, though it has its critics,40 informs us about 
the relative values of different options.41 But this method of 
analysis does not speak to budget dynamics. Even aggregating 
all of the cost-benefit analyses conducted for a given time period 
of EPA actions would only tell us how much EPA expected to 
spend on its actions and the value of the environmental quality 
benefits it expected them to produce. While its explanation for 
the latter would necessarily need to describe some form of causal 
 
See generally Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of 
Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1997) 
(arguing that lack of adequate EPA funding has diminished water quality 
across states). 
 39. EPA Budget Cuts, supra note 14. 
 40. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562–63 
(2002) (arguing the ineffective nature of cost-benefit analysis as seen in its cre-
ation of artificial markets and devaluation through discounting); Amy Sinden, 
A “Cost-Benefit State”? Reports of Its Birth Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 46 
ENVTL. L. REP.: NEWS & ANALYSIS 10933, 10934–39 (2016) (discussing agencies’ 
abilities to consider costs through means other than cost-benefit analysis). 
 41. For a seminal outline of how cost-benefit analysis can be employed in 
the regulatory state, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FU-
TURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002). 
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chain between its action and the change in environmental qual-
ity—for example, that factories complying with a new emissions 
standard will reduce emissions by some level—that would not 
provide a dynamic understanding of the relationship between 
agency resources and outcomes, much less what the conse-
quences of more or less agency funding would be going forward. 
In short, understanding what happens after EPA issues the new 
standard does not improve our understanding about what hap-
pens before EPA issues the new standard—from the time of fund-
ing to the promulgation of the standard—nor does it improve our 
understanding regarding whether the funding dollars could have 
been more effectively deployed by EPA or another actor. 
To frame the challenge of our research question using a dif-
ferent context, consider the corporate budgeting process. As-
sume you are the CEO of a business and must decide next year’s 
operating budget. This involves determining allocations to each 
corporate division. To do this intelligently requires deciding (1) 
the basic amounts needed for each division to perform its core 
operations; (2) a marginal analysis of which additional dollar 
above the previous year’s budget for each division will result in 
the greatest contributions to the bottom line; and (3) a marginal 
analysis of which dollar reduction below the previous year’s 
budget for each division will minimize harm to the bottom line. 
Should R&D receive a greater increase than marketing? What 
about logistics? To flip the question, when the head of R&D re-
quests her annual budget, she needs to justify why additional 
resources should go to her division rather than be dedicated to 
other uses, as well as why lowering her budget would harm the 
company. These marginal analyses all require understanding 
the firm’s production function. 
Similarly, claims about whether decreasing EPA funding 
will or will not affect environmental protection are at heart 
claims about the production function of environmental quality. 
The doing less with less position argues that EPA funding has a 
significant impact on the nation’s production of environmental 
quality. Those advocating the doing more with less position ar-
gue that other factors—Anderson’s chart does not identify which 
factors—are more important and EPA funding can be decreased 
without reducing (or perhaps while even improving) environ-
mental protection. Indeed, these competing hypotheses domi-
nate today’s political rhetoric regarding regulatory agency fund-
ing, yet they have not been carefully assessed. 
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In this Part, we develop a more robust and complete model 
of the regulatory production function, using EPA and environ-
mental quality as the case study. In short, claims that increased 
or decreased funding for EPA will or will not affect environmen-
tal quality account for only the beginning and the end of the pro-
duction function: funding is a raw input and environmental qual-
ity is the final product. Quite obviously, what goes on between 
those two points also matters. 
A. PRODUCTION FUNCTION THEORY 
Economists have developed the production function model 
to examine the manner in which an output is related to the quan-
tity and nature of inputs, also known as the factors of production, 
used to create it.42 In its most common application, the produc-
tion function relates the physical output of the final products 
from a production process, such as the proverbial widget, to the 
physical inputs or factors of production, such as labor and raw 
materials. Expressed mathematically, the production function in 
its most basic form appears as such: P = f(X, Y), where P is total 
product output and X and Y represent possible inputs.43 For a 
single-product firm, the production function describes the maxi-
mum output it can produce in a fixed period of time. Inputs have 
been traditionally categorized as labor, capital, land, and entre-
preneurship.44 Production functions are often used to determine 
how best to maximize output with a given input or minimize in-
put for a given output. 
Production functions in simple form are subject to a number 
of assumptions. For instance, production functions are generally 
assumed to be linearly homogenous, meaning different combina-
tions of different quantities of X and Y inputs can produce the 
same output P.45 To illustrate this, consider a production func-
tion for potato chips wherein potatoes and labor are two of the 
inputs. An increase in labor might result in more efficient peel-
ing of the potatoes, which in turn could lead to less waste and 
 
 42. Thomas M. Humphrey, Algebraic Production Functions and Their Uses 
Before Cobb-Douglas, 83 ECON. Q. 51, 51 (1997). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Gerald Beer, The Cobb-Douglas Production Function, 53 MATHEMATICS 
MAG. 44, 44 (1980). 
 45. Udo Ebert & Heinz Welsch, Environmental Emissions and Production 
Economics: Implications of the Materials Balance, 89 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 287 
(2007); Edmund H. Mantell, Antinomies in Antitrust Law: Tying and Vertical 
Integration, 7 J.L. & COM. 23, 35–36 (1987). 
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thus lower the necessary amount of potatoes for a given level of 
output. Production functions also assume the existence of an ef-
fective manager within the firm, who is able to determine how 
to best maximize output given a set of inputs.46 Adopting as-
sumptions like these, the production function can be used to an-
alyze issues of allocative efficiency for the firm. 
While the production function’s real-world accuracy is lim-
ited by its simplifying assumptions, it is a key concept of neoclas-
sical economics and the subject of rigorous research and refine-
ment to produce more nuanced models that can apply beyond the 
single-product firm with linear input substitution.47 One thrust 
of variation, for example, focuses on integrating variable elastic-
ities of substitution between inputs.48 Another well-known vari-
ation adds technological innovation, or knowledge, as a multi-
plier making labor and capital more productive,49 leading some 
commentators to describe innovation as “the real engine of eco-
nomic growth.”50 
Yet another important multiplier that can affect output is 
the intermediate-products effect.51 Intermediate products are 
outputs of one production function that serve as inputs to an-
other product’s production function. Economists track the series 
of intermediate products needed to produce the final good—the 
good that is consumed or invested—to calculate gross national 
income.52 For example, natural gas, a product of its own produc-
tion function, can be an intermediate product used to produce 
electricity, and electricity can be an intermediate product used 
in multiple other production functions leading ultimately to final 
products, such as a finished automobile that is purchased by a 
 
 46. Beer, supra note 44. 
 47. For a lengthy discussion of some of the better-known production func-
tions, see S K Mishra, A Brief History of Production Functions, 8 IUP J. MANA-
GERIAL ECON. 6 (2010). 
 48. Beer, supra note 44; J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to In-
tellectual Property Protection: An Empirical Investigation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 209, 
221–22 (1987). 
 49. Shi-Ling Hsu, Capital Rigidities, Latent Externalities, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 
719, 721 n.2 (2014). 
 50. Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
247, 253 (2007). 
 51. Charles I. Jones, Intermediate Goods and Weak Links in the Theory of 
Economic Development, 3 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 1, 1–2 (2011). 
 52. Thomas C. Brown et al., Defining, Valuing, and Providing Ecosystem 
Goods and Services, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 329, 335–37 (2007). 
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consumer. Intermediate products link production sectors (for ex-
ample, natural gas production to electricity production to auto-
mobile production), thus creating the multiplier effect—greater 
efficiency in producing natural gas leads to greater efficiency in 
generating electricity, and so on down the chain into the other 
sectors where electricity is an input. 
As production becomes more complex and scales up, produc-
tion-function theory runs into several complications. One such 
problem is how to aggregate highly heterogeneous capital into a 
single input value. Adding a robotic machine and a hammer into 
the same category, called capital, strikes some commentators as 
pure fiction.53 Even more problematic is the challenge of aggre-
gating firm-level production functions into the level of industry-
wide or economy-wide production functions, which many com-
mentators argue is possible, if at all, only under the most strin-
gent of assumptions and conditions.54 Nevertheless, production 
function theory remains firmly rooted in the research agenda of 
neoclassical economics.  
Though it originated to analyze economic production, the 
production function concept has found application in a number 
of other contexts. For example, a significant amount of legal and 
scientific scholarship has applied the production function to the 
ecological-economics context with a particular focus on ecosys-
tem goods and services.55 Ecosystem services, such as the puri-
fication of water and pollination of plants, are essential to hu-
man well-being and can be thought of economically in that sense. 
Ecosystem services are created by ecosystem processes wherein 
physical and biological factors interact to produce what we per-
ceive as the natural world. In other words, ecosystem services 
are the output of a production function that relies purely on “nat-
ural capital.”56 For instance, photosynthesis is the production 
function that changes soil, water, and sunlight into plants.57 
 
 53. Joan Robinson, The Production Function and the Theory of Capital, 
21 REV. ECON. STUD. 81, 95 (1953). 
 54. Steven Pressman, What Is Wrong with the Aggregate Production Func-
tion?, 31 E. ECON. J. 422, 422 (2005). 
 55. Edward B. Barbier, Valuing Environmental Functions: Tropical Wet-
lands, 70 LAND ECON. 155, 167–71 (1994); James Boyd et al., Compensation for 
Lost Ecosystem Services: The Need for Benefit-Based Transfer Ratios and Resto-
ration Criteria, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 393, 403–06 (2001) (cited pages directly 
discuss production functions); Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital 
Through Ecosystem Service Districts, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 357–59 (2001). 
 56. Brown et al., supra note 52. 
 57. Laurie A. Wayburn & Anton A. Chiono, The Role of Federal Policy in 
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Ecosystem services may serve as intermediate product inputs of 
the production functions of other ecosystem services, meaning 
that impairing or promoting one ecosystem service would affect 
the output of another.58 In turn, ecosystem goods and services 
can become inputs for manufactured goods and services along 
with labor and built capital. Many goods and services that are 
directly beneficial to human life are therefore dependent on eco-
system goods and services in some way.59 Once the production 
functions of ecosystem services and their interactions are deter-
mined, therefore, more socially efficient environmental regula-
tion can take place.60 
As an example of using production functions in social-invest-
ment contexts like the agency budget-output problem, produc-
tion function analysis has also found applications in education 
funding policy. Its use there may be particularly enlightening to 
the agency budget-output question because it addresses the cen-
tral issue of whether or not funding matters in determining ed-
ucational outcomes. The earliest attempt to formulate an educa-
tional production function investigated inequalities in American 
schools and sought to explain them from an input-output per-
spective focused on increasing output by adjusting purchasable 
inputs like teacher salary and class size.61 Study results in this 
education domain have conflicted in their findings, with scholars 
still heavily divided on the issue.62 
The extension of the production function concept to contexts 
such as ecosystem services and education reveals both its value 
and its limits. On the one hand, building the production function 
model of systems, such as ecosystem services and educational 
quality moves analysis, from the proverbial black box to a more 
robust conceptualization of relationships between components of 
 
Establishing Ecosystem Service Markets, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 385, 
392–93 (2010). 
 58. Boyd et al., supra note 55. 
 59. Brown et al., supra note 52. 
 60. Heal et al., supra note 55. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity 
and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1479–82 (2007) (dis-
cussing the academic debate over educational production functions). Compare 
Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy, 28 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 430 (1991) (finding no relationship), with Richard J. 
Murnane, Interpreting the Evidence on “Does Money Matter?”, 28 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 457, 462 (1991) (finding a relationship). 
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the system. In this situation, intervention, whether through reg-
ulation or funding, can most move the needle in terms of improv-
ing outcomes policy makers care about. On the other hand, build-
ing such models and putting them to the empirical test tends to 
reveal how complex the systems are and how much is not known 
about them. With those challenges in mind, in the next section, 
we apply the basic concepts of the production function model to 
the context of regulatory agency budgets. 
B. REGULATORY AGENCIES AS PRODUCERS 
As described above, there are important conceptual similar-
ities between the production functions for corporations and reg-
ulatory agencies. Both seek to understand how marginal 
changes of inputs will impact the respective bottom lines, 
whether balance of sheets or air quality.63 We want to make 
clear at the outset, though, that determining the production 
function of regulatory benefits such as environmental quality is 
a great deal more complex than a single firm’s production func-
tion for widgets. There is a good reason scholars have avoided 
this topic. As Clifford Rechtschaffen has cautiously observed, 
“Causality between program activities and outcomes is usually 
impossible to prove. Outcomes cannot generally be attributed to 
individual functions of an agency or program. ‘Prevention’ or de-
terrence of undesired outcomes is difficult to measure.”64 
Building a comprehensive model may well be beyond our 
scope and grasp, but building even a simple model would repre-
sent a major improvement over the current superficial debate of 
funding = benefits versus funding ≠ benefits. Our efforts below 
represent a starting point for generating hypotheses in Part III 
to explain why the relationship between agency funding and so-
cial-welfare outcomes is as complicated as Rechtschaffen posits 
and why EPA funding may have a less influential role in the pro-
duction of environmental quality than the doing less with less 
position asserts.  
As a starting point, despite its complex appearance, the fig-
ure below sets out a simplified model of the key factors affecting 
 
 63. See generally Humphrey, supra note 42 (discussing the production func-
tion model and its examination of the relationship between outputs and inputs). 
 64. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving 
Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1272 n.390 
(1998) (quoting EPA, MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF EPA’S ENFORCEMENT 
AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM, DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PER-
FORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY (Sept. 1997)). 
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air quality and how the factors interact with one another. Be-
yond EPA action, these include the actions of Congress, state 
governments, and nongovernmental organizations; technologi-
cal innovation; and economic activity. In addition, it is likely that 
some of these factors have an extended effect over time, and in-
deed may have a greater effect only once some time has passed. 
Our point here is not to claim that we have captured exactly how 
environmental quality is determined—to the contrary, we be-
lieve the flowchart certainly oversimplifies matters—but rather 
to show the broad schematics of the dynamic. 
 
Figure 1 
 
We are seeing this dynamic play out in the early stages of 
the Trump Administration. With threats of reduced EPA fund-
ing by Congress and the President, some states have proclaimed 
plans to increase their activities to protect the environment,65 
and donations to environmental groups that pledge to fight the 
 
 65. See Adam Nagourney & Henry Fountain, California, at Forefront of Cli-
mate Fight, Won’t Back Down to Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/us/california-climate-change-jerry-brown-donald 
-trump.html (discussing California’s climate initiative and desire to work with 
other nations and states to fight climate change). 
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new administration in the courts have increased.66 
In addition to the range of actors involved and their influ-
ence on one another, it is also important to recognize the vectors. 
EPA, for example, influences air quality through its production 
of regulations, policies, and enforcement, among other actions. 
These can be thought of as intermediate products in the produc-
tion of environmental quality because they are produced be-
tween raw inputs (funding) and the final product (air quality). 
These are critical to production of the final product, but are part 
of the production chain, not the final product. In most cases, 
therefore, EPA does not use funding to produce environmental 
quality directly; it first has to produce intermediate products 
such as regulations, monitoring tools, education programs, and 
so on. EPA and other institutions then use these intermediate 
products to continue down the production chain until some actor 
or action changes conditions that directly change environmental 
quality, such as reducing emissions or restoring a wetland area. 
For example, a new EPA regulation could be enforced by a state 
agency that issues a permit requiring an industrial facility to in-
stall technology to reduce air emissions. When emissions fall, 
that is when environmental quality changes, not EPA receiving 
funding or issuing the rule. The central role of intermediate 
products is equally true for other governance institutions, such 
as states and counties. 
Acknowledging the numerous institutions and intermediate 
products involved in the production of environmental quality is 
not a new revelation. The problem is that rarely do academics or 
practitioners step back to ask how the system as a whole works. 
In fact, quite the opposite: they tend to focus on the production 
and performance of intermediate products rather than the pro-
duction of environmental quality, the latter being what they re-
ally should care about. This is a critically important point. 
Agencies, scholars, and politicians weighing in on the EPA’s 
role in the production of environmental quality generally focus 
on the EPA’s production of intermediate products and how they 
perform.67 The EPA’s strategic plans set goals for regulations 
 
 66. See John O’Connell, Election Provides Fundraising Windfall for Envi-
ronmental Organizations, CAPITAL PRESS (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www 
.capitalpress.com/Nation_World/Nation/20170119/election-provides-fund 
-raising-windfall-for-environmental-organizations (discussing the inflow of fi-
nancial support for environmentalist groups, along with the desire to use the 
courts to make public the tax awards to successful claims). 
 67. See, e.g., William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 
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promulgated, rules reviewed, companies inspected, or sanctions 
enforced.68 Cost-benefit analysis and risk assessments scruti-
nize proposed agency regulations and policies.69 Litigation chal-
lenges intermediate products such as regulations and permits.70 
These are all important activities, so one can understand the fo-
cus on intermediate products. Agency offices, for example, can 
directly control intermediate products such as regulations but 
cannot directly control air quality or water quality since there 
are too many intervening factors. The problem is that a myopic 
focus on intermediate products risks missing what really mat-
ters—whether pollution in the environment is increasing or de-
creasing. To coopt a metaphor, agencies, scholars, and politicians 
are focusing on intermediate product trees rather than the envi-
ronmental quality forest. 
From a budgeting perspective, however, it is vital to scruti-
nize not only how agencies produce intermediate products, but 
how the system works overall—how agencies and other institu-
tions take the raw input of upstream funding to produce inter-
mediate products that are used downstream to produce environ-
mental quality (or not). Moreover, as we shall discuss in Part V, 
it is equally as important to consider how the various intermedi-
ate products compare, not only within the agency, but also across 
 
129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1981) (discussing EPA efforts that it expects will 
result in pollution control); Press Release, Representative Lamar Smith, House 
Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., Smith Criticizes EPA Methane Rule (May 12, 
2016). 
 68. See, e.g., EPA, FY 2014–2018 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 54 (2014) (detailing 
annual performance measures that aid in the achievement of EPA’s goals). The 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 had a larger goal in mind, 
requiring agencies to develop five-year strategic plans that set long-term goals 
for the agency’s major functions, set performance measures, and report results. 
Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993), as amended by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-352 (2011). In the case of EPA, however, the goals have been 
largely qualitative and focused on intermediate products. See, e.g., EPA, OFFICE 
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, 
at 5–9 (2014), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/ 
epa_oig_annual_performance_report_fy_2013.pdf (detailing the EPA’s themes 
and goals for the year). 
 69. See, e.g., EPA, OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020, at 7-1 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/fullreport_rev_a.pdf (predicting the 
likelihood, though uncertain, that benefits of the Clean Air Act will exceed 
costs). 
 70. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (holding that 
EPA, when deciding to regulate power plants, unreasonably considered cost to 
be irrelevant). 
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institutions. Perhaps a corporate training program or state 
agency information-disclosure program could improve pollution 
reduction outcomes more efficiently than does an EPA inspection 
program. In short, one cannot reasonably understand the rela-
tionship between regulatory agency funding and the outcomes 
without studying the larger production function—the entire sys-
tem, both upstream and downstream—from budget, to interme-
diate products, to environmental quality. 
Understanding how environmental quality is produced, 
though, is easier said than done. It is a complex function, in the 
true sense of the term. To understand why, in Part III we open 
the black box and look inside. 
III.  UNPACKING THE REGULATORY PRODUCTION 
FUNCTION   
In Part II, we sketched a simplified model of how environ-
mental quality is produced and identified the importance of in-
termediate products at EPA and other institutions use their in-
puts to produce. Most research and measures of agency success 
tend to focus on the production and performance of discrete in-
termediate products rather than the larger production function 
linking budget inputs with social welfare outputs. In this Part, 
we identify the specific drivers of the larger production function, 
setting out four broad categories of factors that might explain 
Terry Anderson’s graph showing no apparent relationship be-
tween overall EPA funding and improvements in air quality: (1) 
funding processes; (2) the diverse ecosystem of institutions and 
their intermediate products; (3) the internal dynamics of the pro-
duction function; and (4) external forces potentially disrupting 
the production function. 
A. ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS AND FUNDING 
EPA is surely in the business of environmental protection. 
That said, while environmental quality is a key goal of EPA, it 
may not be its only goal, and sometimes not even its most im-
portant goal. Given its multiple principals and audiences, the 
agency has other concerns as well.71 
To begin with, EPA’s budget may not be primarily directed 
 
 71. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 315–17 (1989) (discuss-
ing how government agencies often focus efforts on those activities that can be 
observed and counted). 
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at environmental quality. Unlike a business, an agency’s spend-
ing discretion is limited and the result of an explicitly political, 
rather than technical, process. Every February, the President 
submits a budget to Congress reflecting the negotiations be-
tween the different agencies and the White House. The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) is the key player in these dis-
cussions.72 The submitted budget is subjected to committee hear-
ings and adjusted by Congress, with members influencing the 
budget to reflect their particular concerns (which may or may 
not focus on maximizing environmental quality).73 Taken to-
gether, the final budget can differ considerably from what the 
agency first proposed. In 2016, for example, the President’s 
budget proposal for EPA requested $8.6 billion74 and Congress 
appropriated $8.1 billion.75 Just over forty percent of this 
amount was for State and Tribal Assistance Grants that pass 
through directly to the recipients.76 EPA has no authority to 
spend this money.77 When those funds were combined with 
funds dedicated to cleaning up contaminated sites, about fifty-
six percent of EPA’s proposed budget was locked up.78 Even the 
agency’s remaining funds are somewhat constrained because of 
statutory requirements and court-ordered consent decrees.79 
 
 72. Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy 
Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182, 2207–08 (2015). 
 73. See generally Joseph C. Stanko, Jr., EPA’s Budget: How Low Will It Go?, 
HUNTON & WILLIAMS: THE NICKEL REPORT (June 20, 2017), http://www 
.huntonnickelreportblog.com/2017/06/epas-budget-how-low-will-it-go (discuss-
ing the proposed reduction to EPA’s budget and the reduction’s effect on the 
EPA’s operations). 
 74. See EPA, FY 2016: EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 3 (2015), http://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/fy_2016_bib_ combined_v5.pdf. 
 75. See EPA’s Budget and Spending, supra note 8. 
 76. The total allocated for State and Tribal Assistance Grants under the 
2016 EPA budget was $3.5 billion, or approximately 43.8% of the total budget. 
EPA, FY 2017: EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 85 (2016) [hereinafter 2017 EPA 
BUDGET], http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/fy17 
-budget-in-brief.pdf. 
 77. See Multipurpose Grants to States and Tribes, EPA, http://www.epa 
.gov/grants/multipurpose-grants-states-and-tribes (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) 
(discussing the use of these funds to support “state-defined high priority activi-
ties”). 
 78. The 2016 Superfund Cleanup budget was $1.1 billion. 2017 EPA 
BUDGET, supra note 76, at 83. Thus, the total dedicated in 2016 to State and 
Tribal Assistance Grants and Superfund cleanup was $4.6 billion, or 56.8% of 
the total 2016 EPA budget. 
 79. See, e.g., Larry Bell, EPA’s Secret and Costly ‘Sue and Settle’ Collusion 
with Environmental Organizations, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes 
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Given that the budget results from politics rather than a focus 
on the environmental bottom line, one would not expect a tight 
correlation. 
Moreover, much attention—in Congress, in the media, and 
by researchers—is paid to EPA’s compliance and enforcement ef-
forts. Compliance and enforcement tend to be easily quantifia-
ble: how many enforcement actions are taken, and how large are 
the fines? Enforcement actions against large companies, and the 
imposition of large fines, have tended to draw considerable me-
dia coverage.80 It would hardly be unreasonable for EPA to 
choose to divert resources to measures that it feels the media 
carefully follows even if they are indirectly related to environ-
mental quality. Equally, one might expect an agency with little 
oversight to feel free to pursue long-term, as opposed to short-
term, goals—likely those that are less quantifiable and less read-
ily subject to measurement.  
Since there will always be more than one goal for the agency 
to pursue, it will also need to allocate resources among its goals. 
The emergence of a new policy concern might cause an agency to 
spread its resources around. For example, the issue of climate 
change and greenhouse gases has loomed larger and larger over 
the last decade, requiring more agency resources. Nor is there a 
single measure of air quality. EPA might choose to pursue envi-
ronmental quality by seeking to meet all uniform nationwide 
standards (as the Clean Air Act does through its creation of na-
tional ambient air quality standards), by focusing on improving 
environmental quality in areas where it is especially poor, or by 
prioritizing some pollutants over others.81 Moreover, the silo ap-
proach of the agency’s organization—under which personnel and 
 
.com/sites/larrybell/2013/02/17/epas-secret-and-costly-sue-and-settle-collusion 
-with-environmental-organizations/#44f50b8ef4e5 (“[T]he U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce discovered many new rulemakings and unreasonable permitting de-
lays which appeared to have resulted from such consent decrees in which the 
EPA agreed to bind itself to issue new regulations on a specific timetable . . . .”). 
 80. See, e.g., Chris Isidore, Fiat Chrysler Cheated on Diesel Emissions, EPA 
Says, CNN (Jan. 13, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/12/news/companies/ 
epa-emissions-cheating-fiat-chrysler/index.html?iid=ob_homepage_ 
deskrecommended_pool (discussing how multiple carmakers have been caught 
cheating on emissions tests). 
 81. Cf. James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Magnitude and Policy Im-
plications of Health Risks from Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZING SUPER-
FUND 55, 76–80 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995) (criticizing 
risk assessment under CERCLA statute as sometimes too stringent, in part as 
a response to public perceptions of risks of hazardous waste sites); Jonathan 
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management responsibilities are divided according to separate 
media (air, water, solid waste)82—means that there will be inter-
nal office decisions as to which goals to prioritize, and those de-
cisions may not align with overall improvements in environmen-
tal quality.  
B. INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS 
As the diagram in Part II showed, a range of institutions 
contribute to improving environmental quality—such as the 
EPA, state and local government, industry, and NGOs. In some 
cases these institutions have interconnecting relationships with 
EPA—such as when EPA delegates pollution permitting author-
ity to a state and then oversees how that state administers the 
program to regulate private entities.83 But all environmental 
quality production need not necessarily begin with, go through, 
or even touch EPA. State and local agencies have budgets and 
authorities that may be outside the scope of EPA’s domain,84 and 
private institutions can engage in their own forms of environ-
mental policy, independent of any EPA mandates.85 
Importantly, in all of these instances (except direct industry 
emissions) these institutional players are producing intermedi-
ate products in the form of policy instruments. In other words, 
EPA uses its budget to produce regulations, monitor, sanction, 
educate, conduct research, and so on. The same is true for state 
and local regulators. Industry groups develop codes of practice, 
and businesses and NGOs file citizen suits, lobby agency and 
elected officials, and mobilize at the grassroots. None of these 
activities directly produces improvements or harms to environ-
 
Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketa-
ble Permit Schemes To Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
569, 578–79 (2001) (explaining how the shape of the damage function for a pol-
lutant determines whether the pollutant is better uniformly distributed or con-
centrated a few points). 
 82. See EPA Organization Chart, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/ 
epa-organization-chart (last updated Mar. 14, 2017). 
 83. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 71.10 (2017) (authorizing the EPA to delegate au-
thority to administer air quality operating permits to state, local, or tribal agen-
cies). 
 84. Clifford Rechtschaffen & David L. Markell, Improving State Environ-
mental Enforcement Performance Through Enhanced Government Accountabil-
ity and Other Strategies, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10559, 10577 (2003). 
 85. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 129, 162–63 (2013). 
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mental quality. These are all outputs of each institution’s partic-
ular production function that then, as intermediate products, go 
into the larger environmental quality production function. 
These intermediate products, though, are much easier to 
measure and link directly to resource levels, which explains 
why most studies of how we produce environmental protection 
have focused on evaluating the role of intermediate products 
such as enforcement actions.86 Less attention is paid to their role 
in the larger production of environmental quality—that is, which 
intermediate goods are most influential in the production func-
tion—which will likely change depending on the measure of en-
vironmental quality and over time. One could hold constant or 
increase funding of the agency, for example, but not contribute 
to environmental quality because the agency is producing the 
wrong intermediate products.  Some of the most important of 
these intermediate products are briefly described below. 
1. Regulations 
Some of Terry Anderson’s chart can be explained by regula-
tory history—the production of highly effective intermediate 
products in the form of regulatory standards. Referring back to 
Chart 2, one can spot large drops in pollution soon after major 
regulatory enactments. Lead levels dropped dramatically after 
EPA adopted regulations in the early 1970s87 and NOx fell after 
regulations the EPA adopted pursuant to the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.88 
It should not be surprising that promulgation of strict regu-
lations leads to pollution reductions. As a consequence, resources 
spent on regulatory drafting and implementation will likely have 
greater impacts on environmental quality than other agency ex-
penditures, such as on public education. And these can be rela-
tively inexpensive activities. Moreover, when money is spent de-
veloping a regulation and when it is implemented may differ 
considerably, confounding efforts to link agency spending on en-
vironmental quality. 
 
 86. See, e.g., Mintz, supra note 11, at 10511 (discussing a reduced number 
of facility inspections and civil actions as evidence of a less effective EPA). 
 87. See Joseph L. Annest et al., Chronological Trend in Blood Lead Levels 
Between 1976 and 1980, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1373, 1373, 1375–76 (1983). 
 88. See, e.g., Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Control Regulations, EPA, http://www 
.epa.gov/region1/airquality/nox.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2017) (noting a fall 
in NOx emissions from utilities and large stationary sources between 1990 and 
1996). 
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Nevertheless, focusing on agency budgets may also largely 
miss the point. As a regulatory agency, EPA’s costs are a rela-
tively minor factor in the overall production function of environ-
mental quality. The main costs for reducing pollution fall on the 
regulated community.89 Thus, one  reaction to budget cuts might 
be that the agency shields its regulation-producing offices, pro-
tecting its most effective units (similar to how the body shunts 
blood to the brain when starved of oxygen).90 
2. Monitoring and Enforcement 
The conventional wisdom is that less agency enforcement 
will result in worse outcomes in the relevant policy area. As Gary 
Becker’s classic formulation asserted, rational actors will adjust 
their noncompliant behavior based on the likelihood of detection 
and the magnitude of sanction.91 This partly explains the results 
of the Flatt and Collins research: when state agencies spend less 
on enforcement, plants spend more time in noncompliance. 
There is an equally strong body of literature, however, sug-
gesting that much environmental noncompliance is not the re-
sult of bad faith but rather lack of capacity.92 Most regulated 
parties, this literature suggests, would comply if they knew 
how.93 The problem is not inadequate monitoring and sanctions 
 
 89. Interestingly, measured in terms of the number of rules published in 
the Federal Register, there has been little or no correlation between regulation 
and budget. According to the Americans for Competitive Enterprise, a deregu-
latory think tank, apart from the drop in 2012–2013 that the authors attribute 
to a decrease in regulatory activity in the run-up to the 2012 election, EPA reg-
ulations did not noticeably decline from 2002–2013. Clyde Wayne Crews, Red 
Tapeworm 2014: Are Environmental Protection Agency Regulations Declining? 
Don’t Bet on It, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.cei.org/ 
blog/red-tapeworm-2014-are-environmental-protection-agency-regulations 
-declining-dont-bet-it. 
 90. Former EPA Deputy Administrator Robert Perciasepe has described 
the agency’s budget strategy in terms of saving jobs. Perciasepe, supra note 10 
(“For many years, a budget priority for EPA was to preserve the work force. 
That came to an end in the first term of Obama as the budget kept getting 
squeezed both [in funding] and by inflation. A ‘preserve the workforce’ policy 
was eroding research, extramural assistance (contractors) and basic employee 
support like training and new computer equipment. EPA let the FTE level float 
down to 15,000 from about 18,000 by attrition and buyouts.”). 
 91. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169, 207 (1968). 
 92. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem 
of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 794–96 
(2003). 
 93. Id. (“For us the important message is that the regulatory community—
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but lack of resources to navigate complex regulatory regimes.94 
Put another way, it is possible that reducing enforcement 
expenditures would have little impact on environmental quality 
because most parties would still comply. This is an empirical 
question and has important implications for EPA’s enforcement 
strategies. If true, it suggests that EPA could shift its enforce-
ment emphasis from specific deterrence (changing the behavior 
of the individual charged) to general deterrence (a smaller num-
ber of enforcement actions intended to influence the larger reg-
ulated community). 
3. The Importance of State and Local Protection Efforts 
The intermediate products of state and local agencies also 
include regulations, inspections, and enforcement. If you com-
pare the number of environmental agency personnel at the fed-
eral and state levels, state officials far outnumber those at 
EPA.95 Indeed, through its cooperative federalism model, the 
EPA has delegated the implementation and enforcement of most 
of its significant environmental laws to states, writing the regu-
lations for states to enforce while retaining an oversight and 
strategic role.96 As a result, one would expect that the EPA’s 
budget would be less important for environmental quality than 
are state budgets. A key question, therefore, is whether there is 
a correlation between state agency budgets and environmental 
quality. The Flatt and Collins study suggests this may be the 
 
both regulators and the regulated alike—strongly perceives the sheer number 
of rules as an impediment to compliance.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. EPA had 15,376 full-time equivalents in FY 2016. See EPA, supra note 
76, at 11. California has over 4000; New York over 3000; Texas about 2800; 
Florida about 3100. CalEPA Employment Information, CAL. EPA, http://calepa 
.ca.gov/Employment (last visited Nov. 4, 2017); Employment, N.Y. DEP’T OF EN-
VTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/about/jobs.html (last visited Nov. 4, 
2017); About the TCEQ, TEX. COMM’N ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.tceq 
.texas.gov/about (last visited Nov. 4, 2017); Administration, FLA. DEP’T OF EN-
VTL. PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/stats/administration.htm (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
 96. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012) (assigning to states the responsibility 
to create Clean Air Act state implementation plans, subject to EPA approval); 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012) (allowing EPA to delegate some NPDES permitting 
to states); SARAH GRACE LONGSWORTH ET AL., ENVTL. COUNCIL OF STATES, 
STATE DELEGATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTS (2016), https://www.ecos.org/ 
documents/state-delegations (“Many federal environmental statutes were de-
signed by the U.S. Congress to allow states to assume partial or full control of 
the resulting programs through the delegation process.”). 
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case, but more direct research is needed (we provide an example 
below in Part IV). A potential problem with this explanation is 
that many state environmental agency budgets have also been 
cut over time, some dramatically so.97 
4. Industry Codes of Conduct 
Linked to the explanation of market forces described above, 
private standards may serve the purpose of regulation and obvi-
ate the need for EPA resources. For example, Michael Vanden-
bergh has provided many examples of private certification sys-
tems effectively acting as regulations through supply chains and 
being enforced by large retailers such as Walmart and Home De-
pot.98 The key question, of course, is to what extent such private 
standards actually influence environmental quality. 
5. Nongovernmental Actors’ Use of Citizen Suits 
One of the defining features of environmental law is the abil-
ity of nonstate actors under many statutes to step into the shoes 
of public prosecutor and litigate against agencies when they are 
not carrying out mandatory duties or against any entity, includ-
ing the agency, alleged to be violating the statute.99 These so-
called citizen suits can be path breaking and certainly offer one 
likely explanation for why environmental quality might not de-
cline, or could even increase, during times of agency austerity. 
Indeed, the number of citizen suits clearly increased during the 
Reagan Administration, when EPA enforcement efforts were re-
duced.100 As a result, even when agency resources dwindle or 
 
 97. Eighteen states decreased the budget of their environmental agencies 
between 2011 and 2015. See Linda K. Breggin, Are State Agency Budgets Rising 
Enough To Meet New Challenges?, ENVTL. F., Sept.–Oct. 2016, at 11. 
 98. Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 197 (discussing Walmart’s commitment 
to reduce its supply-chain emissions); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Keynote Ad-
dress at Pace Environmental Law Review Symposium: Reconceptualizing the 
Future of Environmental Law (Mar. 20, 2015) (transcript on file with Pace 
Law School), http://www.law.pace.edu/symposium-reconceptualizing-future 
-environmental-law; Performance, HOME DEPOT, https://corporate.homedepot 
.com/responsibility/performance (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (describing Home 
Depot’s progress in reducing emissions and using less energy). 
 99. See Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and 
Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 46 (2001) (describ-
ing the standard citizen-suit provisions that appear in most of the major envi-
ronmental statutes). 
 100. See Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 
65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 352, 360 n.94 (1990) (discussing an increase in citizen suits 
during the mid-1980s). 
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there is little political will for strong enforcement, there exists a 
potent backup. Organized interest groups can take on enforce-
ment efforts at times of agency austerity. 
C. INTERNAL DYNAMICS 
In addition to the range of intermediate products produced 
by EPA and other actors, one must also consider their relative 
importance. A thoughtful decision-maker needs to choose not 
only which intermediate products to produce but how much of 
each. This decision requires consideration of marginal returns, 
substitutability, path dependence, and innovation. 
1. Marginal Returns 
Following neoclassical economic theory, adding marginal in-
crements of an input over time eventually leads to diminishing 
marginal returns of the final product.101 Applying this principle 
to the environmental quality production function, each produc-
tion input that influences environmental quality, from raw in-
puts like funding to intermediate product inputs like regula-
tions, likely does so in a nonlinear relationship with diminishing 
marginal returns. 
For example, let’s say EPA initiates a new widget facility 
inspection program. In year one, it inspects 100 facilities and de-
tects 200 violations, which when corrected reduces emissions by 
quantity X. Each year it adds 100 facilities into the program un-
til, after five years, all 500 widget facilities are being inspected 
every year. It is highly unlikely that the program will produce 
5(X) emissions reductions year after year. Each time a facility is 
first inspected, the most egregious violations are detected—the 
program catches the low hanging fruit. Over time, most viola-
tions the program detects will be minor except for possible bad 
actor violations. As a result, the program cannot possibly expect 
to return the same annual emissions reductions over time. 
A particular policy instrument may also have diminishing 
marginal returns because of physical properties of technology 
and the environment. It may simply not be possible to produce a 
widget without some level of particulate emissions. Once regula-
tion or other measures have squeezed the widget industry down 
 
 101. Law of Diminishing Returns, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 
2002). 
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to that level, only reductions in total widget production or a tech-
nological breakthrough will produce lower total emissions. This 
is why many pollution regulation programs take technology into 
account.102 
Diminishing marginal returns can explain why EPA fund-
ing changes may have little impact on air quality measures. 
EPA’s mix of intermediate products devoted to reducing particu-
late emissions, for example, could reach a phase of diminished 
marginal returns where the low-hanging fruit have all been 
picked. This works in both directions, however: if EPA has 
reached the point that adding another dollar to produce an in-
termediate product yields little or no incremental addition in ag-
gregate benefit, then taking away a dollar will likewise yield lit-
tle or no incremental reduction in aggregate benefit. 
Keep in mind, however, that while decreasing budgets for 
intermediate products may initially, and perhaps for a good 
while, produce little incremental change in emissions, eventu-
ally the reductions in budget, because of the nonlinear property 
of the budget-outcome dynamic, would move back into a phase of 
increasing marginal effects. At some point, therefore, major cuts 
in EPA funding should result in significant reductions in envi-
ronmental quality. This raises issues of resiliency, which we ad-
dress in Part V. 
2. Input Substitutability 
Given the large universe of institutions and instruments at 
work in the environmental quality production function, it is 
highly likely that (1) not every input has the same marginal re-
turns curve; and (2) some inputs can substitute for others and 
improve production efficiency. To put it bluntly, if you had $100 
million to spend on environmental quality improvement, would 
you simply hand it all to EPA and say, here you go, run with it? 
Certainly not. A prudent investor in environmental quality 
would investigate which inputs get the most marginal bang for 
the buck. Perhaps financing industry best-practice codes is more 
effective on the margin in reducing emissions than adding to 
EPA’s monitoring budget, or perhaps financing NGO citizen 
 
 102. See Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit 
Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 159, 198–99 (1983) (discussing how Congress has “acknowledged 
economic concerns by adopting a technology-based approach”). 
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suits is more effective than financing industry codes. If the in-
termediate products EPA is using have low marginal returns 
and other institutions are using products with higher marginal 
returns, the other institutions are necessarily going to have more 
influence with the marginal dollar on the intended regulatory 
benefits. 
3. Path Dependence from Capital Investments 
We have already noted the relationship between strict reg-
ulation and improvements in environmental quality. This rela-
tionship raises additional questions: Why do regulated parties 
comply initially with the regulations, and then continue to im-
prove performance over time? For many pollutants, capital in-
vestment locks in pollution gains. For those air pollutants that 
are reduced by pollution control devices, once the control tech-
nologies have been installed they should keep pollutant levels 
down so long as there is not a high cost of operation and mainte-
nance. And even if there are high operating costs, companies 
may still choose to keep the technologies in place. The implica-
tion is that once EPA sets the reductions in motion through reg-
ulation, the reductions become locked in place irrespective of 
later reductions in EPA’s budget. While this could explain initial 
drops in pollution, however, it does not explain why the concen-
trations of many pollutants continued to drop over time. That 
may be due, at least in part, to different plants reaching full com-
pliance at different times. 
4. Innovation 
Production function theory includes innovation as a power-
ful force in improving the ability of firms to produce products 
more efficiently. Similarly, just as a new technology or new prod-
uct can change the production function of a widget, the creation 
of new institutions and instruments can strongly affect the reg-
ulatory production function. For example, the creation of EPA in 
1970 changed the production function of environmental quality 
by providing an institutional framework for the implementation 
of the new environmental laws.103 The lead phasedown and Toxic 
Release Inventory programs were all new kinds of intermediate 
 
 103. But see Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Environmental Regu-
lation: Reconsidering the Federal Role in Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 93, 96 (2004) (pointing out that “by 1966, every state had adopted 
water pollution legislation of some sort”). 
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products that changed the production function. And some inno-
vative market-based instruments, such as the SO2 cap-and-trade 
program and wetlands mitigation banking, have greatly reduced 
the costs of regulation.104 These are all examples of regulatory 
innovation, not just iterations of traditional regulatory ap-
proaches, each having a profound effect on the efficiency of the 
regulatory production function.105 
D. EXTERNAL FORCES 
The last major driver of the production function for environ-
mental quality is external to the system. These include most 
prominently market forces, global and domestic politics, and nat-
ural stochastic events. While increasing agency spending might 
improve environmental quality all else equal, all else will not be 
equal. For example, spending money to expand the size of a po-
lice force might well reduce crime “all else equal,” but other ex-
trinsic factors—such as the state of the economy, overcrowding 
in prisons, and the weather—may have a larger combined mar-
ginal effect on crime.106 Depending on those other factors, it is 
possible that an increase in funding might be seen to accompany 
a decrease in goal quality. In other words, external forces could 
overwhelm actions by EPA, indeed by most of the relevant gov-
ernment actors, to influence environmental quality. 
1. Market Effects 
Market forces act on economic and regulatory production 
functions at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, 
economic growth has a major influence on levels of production of 
goods and services and therefore levels of most pollutants. The 
 
 104. See Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, The SO2 Allowance 
Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment, 27 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 103, 106–09 (2013) (discussing the performance of the SO2 cap-and-trade 
program); Shirley Jeanne Whitsitt, Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 3 ENVTL. 
LAW. 441, 459–62 (1997) (describing the benefits of wetlands mitigation bank-
ing). 
 105. See David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in 
Theory and Application, Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 629 (2016) (arguing that 
policy design should account for potential innovation in regulatory approaches, 
giving administrators management tools that are adaptive enough to enable 
them to take advantage of potential developments and thus promote efficiency). 
 106. See Mitchell B. Chamlin & Beth A. Sanders, Reintroducing “Time” into 
the Time Series Analysis of the Police Size-Crime Relationship: An Error Correc-
tion Approach, 31 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATS. & MGMT. 499, 509 (2008) 
(discussing the challenge of controlling for the effect of extrinsic factors). 
 732 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:695 
 
recent history of China provides clear evidence of that; as is also 
true in the United States.107 Recessions tend to reduce pollution 
while boom periods lead to greatly increased levels of potentially 
polluting activities.108 We address this dynamic in our regres-
sions reported in Part IV by controlling for sovereign gross prod-
uct. 
At the micro level, every pollutant tells its own story. In par-
ticular, parties may have economic incentives to reduce pollution 
wholly apart from regulatory compliance. It may just be good 
business. 
Some of the reductions in particulate matter, for example, 
can be explained by commodity prices. In particular, fracking 
has dramatically changed energy markets in recent years.109 
Natural gas, a cleaner fuel than coal, has dropped in price.110 As 
a result, there has been a large-scale shift as coal-fired utilities 
reduce their coal use and build natural-gas-fired units. The over-
all effect is a drop in particulate matter from electricity generat-
ing units.111 
2. Politics 
Like market forces, significant changes in political land-
scapes also can substantially alter the regulatory production 
function at macro and micro scales. As of this writing, for exam-
ple, President Trump has set in motion sea changes in energy 
 
 107. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Climate Policy & U.S.-China Relations, 12 
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 659, 661 (2011) (linking the fact that the U.S. and China are 
the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters to the economies of those countries). 
 108. See Garth Heutel & Christopher J. Ruhm, Air Pollution and Procyclical 
Mortality, 3 J. ASS’N ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECONOMISTS 667, 683 (2016). 
 109. See, e.g., Christina Nunez, How Has Fracking Changed Our Future?, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 11, 2013), http://environment.nationalgeographic 
.com/environment/energy/great-energy-challenge/big-energy-question/how-has 
-fracking-changed-our-future. 
 110. See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle, Natural Gas Nation: EIA Sees U.S. Future 
Shaped by Fracking, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 7, 2012), https://news 
.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/12/121207-annual-energy-outlook 
-2013. 
 111. While market forces are clearly part of the story, this cannot be the sole 
explanation for three reasons. First, particulate matter concentrations were 
falling before the advent of fracking. Second, other conventional air pollutants 
also have fallen over time so, at a minimum, researchers would need to under-
stand the role of market forces in their respective stories. And finally, another 
market reason for fuel switching from coal to natural gas has been the added 
costs of regulatory compliance from recent Clean Air Act regulations aimed at 
coal-burning pollution. Regulation is also part of the explanation. 
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policy, environmental policy, and other regulatory domains.112 
Although the basic diagram of the air quality production func-
tion depicted above in Chart 1 is likely to remain representa-
tive—despite campaign rhetoric, EPA does not appear to be a 
target for complete elimination—the relationships between the 
actors and sectors, as well as the internal cultures of each actor, 
are likely to be transformed to some nontrivial degree. At a 
macro scale, one could reasonably surmise that new federal pol-
icies promoting energy development, infrastructure, and eco-
nomic interests in general will ascend in priority. This broad pol-
icy trend in turn would likely redirect EPA’s agenda, increase 
environmental NGO activity, and leave more work to the state 
environmental agencies in states pursuing more active environ-
mental policies. President Trump has made clear, for example, 
that EPA will not continue down the road of climate-change reg-
ulation the agency pursued under the Obama Administration.113 
Environmental NGOs are likely to step up activities to resist 
that policy shift, such as litigating to challenge agency repeal of 
regulations, and some state and local agencies will move to fill 
the gaps created by the new federal agenda. The upshot is that 
the marginal impact on environmental quality of funding the 
next dollar to EPA, an NGO, or a state agency is likely to be al-
tered as a result of this massive political upheaval. 
Political effects also are not limited to major events bearing 
so directly on the regulatory production function and may come 
from seemingly distant sources. For example, OPEC’s decisions 
regarding oil production have profound impacts on the U.S. do-
mestic economy,114 which as discussed above can influence the 
effectiveness of additional investment in regulation.115 Simi-
larly, decisions made by India and China regarding the develop-
ment and burning of fossil fuels necessarily influence the effec-
tiveness of U.S. domestic policies regarding carbon emissions.116  
 
 112. See, e.g., A Running List of How Trump Is Changing the Environment, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/how-trump-is 
-changing-science-environment (last updated Oct. 25, 2017). 
 113. See Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,094 (Mar. 31, 2017) 
(rescinding Obama administration executive orders on climate change policy). 
 114. See, e.g., Don Briggs, How Does OPEC Affect US Oil Prices?, USA TO-
DAY (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/10/04/ 
opec-affect-us-oil-prices/73346054. 
 115. See supra notes 107–08. 
 116. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (noting, 
though rejecting, the argument that EPA ought not regulate greenhouse gas 
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3. Natural Stochastic Events 
Parents forever debate the relative contributions of nature 
and nurture, and environmental protection is no different. While 
anthropogenic emissions and waste clearly affect environmental 
quality, so, too, does natural variation. Particularly wet seasons 
will reduce concentrations of water pollutants, while droughts 
will increase them. Wind patterns can disperse concentrations of 
air pollutants. Periods of clear skies and still air will lead to 
greater production of smog than windy and overcast periods. 
Thus, our contributions to environmental quality will always be 
in combination with the changing environmental conditions 
themselves. 
* * * * * 
To summarize, in Part III we have provided a more complete 
(and more complicated) picture of the production function 
sketched in Part II. A few key insights emerge: 
(1) Numerous institutions are involved in the production 
of  environmental quality, but not all of these institutions 
necessarily view environmental quality as their most im-
portant product; 
(2) Regulatory agencies use funding to produce and use 
intermediate instrument products such as regulations, 
standards, litigation, and monitoring that impact envi-
ronmental quality; 
(3) The influence each input and intermediate product 
has on the production function depends on internal func-
tional dynamics such as its marginal effects, substituta-
bility, capital investments, and innovative effect; and 
(4) The overall production function will be affected by ex-
ternal forces such as stochastic natural, market, and po-
litical events. 
Importantly, these insights are equally applicable to other regu-
latory agencies, whether their charge be human health or mar-
ket stability 
IV.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: HOW MUCH DO 
REGULATORY AGENCY BUDGETS MATTER?   
We have used Terry Anderson’s chart overlaying EPA’s 
budget and air quality levels to address the question politicians 
and interest groups have put in play—how much do regulatory 
agency budgets matter?—and to develop the production function 
 
emissions voluntarily, lest the United States lose leverage to negotiate with de-
veloping countries). 
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model as a way of framing the theoretical dimension of the ques-
tion. But what about the empirical question: is there evidence 
that spending by environmental agencies has a positive effect on 
environmental quality? The preceding Parts explained why even 
an environmental agency that sought to improve environmental 
quality might face severe difficulties in being able directly to at-
tain that goal. These same difficulties—the existence of actors 
other than EPA in determining environmental quality; the role 
of, and interplay among, intermediate products in determining 
final environmental quality; and the unpredictable nature of ex-
ternal forces as intervening factors in the causal chain—also 
make it challenging to measure empirically whether government 
spending has an effect on environmental quality. There also is 
the question of exactly what measure of environmental quality 
to use.117 
With that caveat, we nevertheless endeavor to examine em-
pirically Anderson’s focus on the effect (if any) of environmental 
agency spending on ambient air pollution levels for criteria pol-
lutants.118 Anderson’s chart suggests no such relationship. The 
competing theory—the notion that an agency will do less with 
less (and thus more with more) suggests, to the contrary, that an 
increase in agency spending should lead to a decrease in ambient 
pollution levels.  
Along these lines, we consider two primary hypotheses that 
posit how environmental agency funding affects environmental 
quality. The first, Hypothesis A, corresponds to the more with 
more thesis. 
 
Hypothesis A: An increase in environmental agency funding 
 results in an increase in environmental quality. 
 
In contrast to Hypothesis A stands the Null Hypothesis, which 
 
 117. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 36, at 212–15 (noting the diffi-
culty in identifying the proper measure for water quality). Compare William E. 
Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?, 
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903 (2009) (proposing metrics by which to measure out-
put of competition agencies), with Edward Iacobucci & Michael Trebilcock, 
Evaluating the Performance of Competition Agencies: The Limits of Assessment 
Methodologies and Their Policy Implications (Sept. 21, 2016) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with the author) (arguing that it is largely fruitless to try de-
velop measures to compare performance across national competition agencies). 
 118. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2012) (directing the EPA Administrator to de-
velop national ambient air quality standards for criteria pollutants). 
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here corresponds to the more with less thesis. 
 
Null Hypothesis: An increase in environmental agency 
 funding results in no change in environmental quality. 
 
The possibility that there is a lag between funding and expendi-
tures on the one hand, and changes in environmental quality on 
the other, poses a significant challenge. Ideally, we would have 
run our regressions using time-lagged variables, but the paucity 
of the available data made that impractical. Instead, two fea-
tures of our analysis help mitigate the time-lag problem. First, 
as our dependent variable, we focus on annual changes in 2.5-
micrometer particulate matter levels.119 Since particulate mat-
ter is heavier than other pollutants, it remains suspended in the 
air for a shorter time. That, in turn, shortens the time horizon 
across which changes in environmental agency funding affects 
(if indeed it does affect) pollutant concentrations. Second, most 
states’ fiscal years—and the fiscal years for all the states in our 
study—end on June 30,120 while pollutant data are based on the 
calendar year. There is, in other words, a built-in six-month lag. 
Our focus on annual changes in 2.5-micrometer particulate 
matter levels as our dependent variable offers other benefits as 
well. For one thing, data on criteria pollutants—including par-
ticulate matter—are readily available for a large number of air 
quality monitoring stations nationwide and over an extended pe-
riod of years.121 In addition, the fact that particulate matter is a 
heavier pollutant, and remains suspended in the air a shorter 
time, means that it travels a shorter distance from its source 
than do lighter pollutants. This should minimize the challenge 
of accounting for enforcement efforts in distant jurisdictions 
(which would be very relevant for pollutants that travel greater 
distances).122 
 
 119. We took annual averages of the “annual 2013” measure of 2.5-microm-
eter particulate matter (PM2.5) levels at all receptor points for each state in the 
study in EPA’s database. 
 120. See Quick Reference Fiscal Table, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/basic-information-about 
-which-states-have-major-ta.aspx#fyrs (last updated July 13, 2012) (noting that 
all states but Alabama, Michigan, New York and Texas end their fiscal years on 
June 30). 
 121. See Pre-Generated Data Files, EPA, http://aqsdr1.epa.gov/aqsweb/ 
aqstmp/airdata/download_files.html (last updated May 26, 2017). 
 122. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 81, at 576–78 (distinguishing among 
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Our independent variable is the annual change in environ-
mental agency funding devoted to air pollution (converted to 
2013 dollars).123 We initially sought to perform our analysis on 
the funding of EPA itself. However, we found insufficient data 
going back in time to allow us to assemble a dataset with enough 
data points to perform meaningful statistical analysis (we dis-
cuss later the implications of this result for data compilation pol-
icy).124 That said, though we do not report the results, we ran 
statistical tests on the limited EPA data we could assemble.125 
Similar to the statistical tests on the state-level data we describe 
below, we found no statistically significant relationship between 
changes in funding levels and changes in pollution levels.126  
Instead, we performed our analysis using state environmen-
tal agency funding levels, for which more robust data are avail-
able. Given the substantial funding levels state environmental 
protection agencies receive from the EPA, as well as their shar-
ing an overall structure and mission similar to the EPA’s, state 
agencies can act as a close substitute for the EPA in this regard. 
We analyze data from six states: Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, New 
Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. These states include areas that 
have been identified as suffering from the worst 2.5-micrometer 
particulate matter pollution in the nation.127 Because the cost of 
environmental compliance can sometimes vary unpredictably 
and unforeseeably128—which may tend to mask the extent to 
 
global, regional, and local pollutants). 
 123. Our choice to rely on higher-level, broader measures of environmental 
agency funding is a deliberate one. While program-specific funding is more 
likely to address directly the environmental quality issue on which we are fo-
cusing, it is also less likely to remain a consistently reported budget item over 
time, therefore making time series data sets difficult to compile. Broader agency 
funding figures will relate less directly to the particular problem but are more 
amenable to comparisons across periods of time. 
 124. See infra note 132. 
 125. We did not report the results because the limited number of data points 
render the findings insufficiently reliable. 
 126. See infra note 131 (noting the nature of the results of the statistical 
runs on EPA data). 
 127. See AM. LUNG ASS’N, STATE OF THE AIR 15 (2015) (listing areas subject 
to the greatest PM2.5 pollution). We selected a subset of states that included 
heavily polluted areas for which we had reliable budget data. 
 128. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between 
Tradable Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. EN-
VTL. L. REV. 465, 492 (2000) (explaining that market prices for tradable sulfur 
dioxide emissions allowances in the 1990s may have actually decreased as a 
result of “shift to coal . . . which has a lower sulfur content”). 
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which enforcement spending spurs environmental quality—we 
also control for annual state gross product (converted to 2013 
dollars). 
Our analysis examines annual changes in the relevant var-
iables, beginning with the change from 2004 to 2005, and pro-
ceeding to the change from 2012 to 2013. Thus, the study lies 
sufficiently after, and allows for state agency budgets to have 
had time to reflect, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (the 
last major air pollution statute). This also avoids the concern of 
accounting for initial reductions in pollution emissions that were 
relatively inexpensive to effect, and thus (under a rational actor 
model of deterrence), would have required relatively little threat 
of enforcement to induce compliance.  
We ran an ordinary least-square regression, including year 
and state fixed effects, with robust standard errors. The results 
appear in Table 1. They reveal no statistically significant rela-
tionship between changes in agency funding levels and changes 
in particulate matter concentrations. And, though we do not re-
port them here, the results also revealed no significant relation-
ship for similar regressions for (1) other criteria pollutant con-
centrations129 against state environmental-agency air-pollution 
funding levels;130 and also (2) 2.5-micrometer particulate matter 
concentrations against measures of EPA funding.131 In the end, 
 
 129. We did not run a regression with lead concentrations as the dependent 
variable since some states lacked receptor points during some of the time period 
under study. 
 130. We ran regressions (otherwise identical to the regression reported in 
the text) with independent variable being the change in concentration in PM10, 
carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, and sulfur dioxide. In only one re-
gression did the coefficient for the change in pollutant concentration even ap-
proach significance at the 10% level—the regression for ozone concentrations 
(p = 0.102). 
 131. We ran two regressions. In both, the dependent variable was the change 
in national PM2.5 concentrations. We controlled in both regressions for the 
change in the national gross domestic product. Also, insofar as combustion of 
natural gas contributes to particulate matter pollution, we included the annual 
change in the national average citygate price for 1000 cubic feet of natural gas. 
Natural Gas Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www 
.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_a_epg0_pg1_dmcf_m.htm. 
The first regression had the change in EPA support for air quality manage-
ment over the time period 2005–2006 to 2013–2014 as the key independent var-
iable. The federal support for air quality management program includes both 
EPA headquarters and regional federal support to state, tribal, and local air 
pollution control agencies for the implementation of evaluation of programs re-
lated to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The program 
also includes regular review of any associated national guidance and outreach 
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we find no support for Hypothesis A. And, while absence of evi-
dence of a relationship does not mean that there is no such rela-
tionship,132 our empirical analysis confirms the implications of 
Terry Anderson’s chart that there is not a clear relationship be-
tween agency funding and air pollutant concentrations. 
 
information for implementation of standards. See Catalog of Environmental 
Programs, EPA, http://archive.epa.gov/oig/catalog/web/html/44.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 4, 2017). 
The second regression had as the key independent variable the change in 
EPA sub-budget (which represents EPA’s entire budget, before rescission of 
prior years’ funds and pension and benefits accrual) over the time period 2000–
2001 to 2013–2014. 
While change in GDP was a statistically significant predictor of change in 
pollutant concentrations in both regressions, in neither regression was the 
change in EPA funding (or the price of natural gas) a statistically significant 
variable. We decline to report the results owing to the paucity of data points 
(N = 9 for the first regression, and N = 14 for the second). 
 132. In the language of statistics, we lack sufficient observations to validate 
a power analysis. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics and Develop-
ment? Examining Investment Treaty Arbitration Outcomes, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 13, 
41 & n.120 (2014). 
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Table 1: Results of regression of change in                  
PM2.5 concentration 
(2004–05 to 2012–13) 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 
Change in state environ-
mental agency air pollution 
budget 
-0.066 0.099 0.509 
Change in gross product -1.884 0.849 0.032** 
2005–2006 -0.294 0.040 0.000*** 
2006–2007 -0.011 0.052 0.835 
2007–2008 -0.285 0.039 0.000*** 
2008–2009 -0.285 0.048 0.000*** 
2009–2010 -0.078 0.044 0.082* 
2010–2011 -0.186 0.041 0.000*** 
2011–2012 -0.167 0.041 0.000*** 
2012–2013 -0.151 0.033 0.000*** 
Indiana -0.076 0.052 0.153 
Maryland -0.092 0.050 0.071* 
New Jersey -0.093 0.053 0.090* 
Ohio -0.089 0.049 0.075* 
Pennsylvania -0.081 0.056 0.100 
(Intercept) -0.069 0.057 0.000*** 
N = 54; R2 = 0.725. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 
5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
 
We wish to make clear that our finding of no correlation ad-
vances the ball very little in the quest for greater understanding 
of the budget-outcomes relationship. That we found no correla-
tion does not mean there is none. And that is precisely the point 
of our project: we used the best data available on the topic, ap-
plied state of the art regression analysis methods to them, and 
produced a rudimentary result. 
This suggests three important implications: (1) the focus in 
the regulatory state on cost-benefit analysis of intermediate 
products does not stimulate production of the right kind of data 
for assessing the regulatory production function; (2) our time pe-
riod tracked marginal budget changes, but correlations between 
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funding and pollutant levels may only appear after more signif-
icant reductions; and (3) regression analysis may not be the ex-
clusive tool needed to address the problem. In sum, the produc-
tion function model of the regulatory agency budget-outcomes 
relationship calls for generating new kinds of data, anticipating 
a broader set of influential causal factors, and applying new 
kinds of analytical tools. We turn to this challenge in Part V. 
V.  FOUNDATIONS FOR RESEARCH   
We opened this paper by contrasting the conventional wis-
dom that reduced EPA funding will impair environmental qual-
ity with Terry Anderson’s chart purporting to refute that rela-
tionship. Neither view, however, relies on more than a 
superficial black-box model of how EPA’s budget produces envi-
ronmental quality. As Part I showed, scholars from relevant dis-
ciplines have not provided a more robust theoretical or empirical 
explanation of the relationship between agency budget and out-
comes. In Part II, we explained why a production function model 
would be useful in understanding this relationship, and in Part 
III we set out a more detailed picture of the different drivers op-
erating within the production function, explaining why environ-
mental quality might show no correlation to agency resources 
when in fact a relationship could exist. To dig deeper, Part IV 
then ran a series of regressions designed to test the correlation 
between agency budget and measures of air quality, but found 
no statistically significant correlation based on available data. 
So, what have we learned? Alternative hypotheses continue 
to be available for our findings. The fact that we find no correla-
tion between EPA funding and air quality could be because EPA 
is producing the wrong intermediate products, or not enough of 
the important ones compared to the intermediate products other 
institutions can produce (that is, the most important drivers dur-
ing this time period may have been citizen suits or the low price 
of natural gas). Or the opposite may be true—perhaps EPA is 
producing the right intermediate products and doing so effi-
ciently, such that budget austerity does not hinder the agency’s 
production of environmental quality. There are three key points 
to emphasize: (1)these alternatives suggest very different reali-
ties with completely different law and policy implications; (2)it 
is not clear which is accurate; and (3) policy makers do not have 
a robust methodology to figure this out. 
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Why should we care about developing a more sophisticated 
understanding of the relationship between agency funding and 
outcomes? The obvious answer is that the competing black-box 
models leave policy-makers deciding the appropriate size and al-
location of agency budgets with no means to assess their decision 
apart from the percent increase or decrease compared to previ-
ous budgets. This is as true for EPA as for other regulatory agen-
cies. When presidential and congressional candidates call for 
major budget cuts, as will likely happen in the next few years,133 
we need to better understand the likely consequences beyond re-
ducing the deficit. It may be that the regulatory production func-
tion is simply too complicated to understand through quantita-
tive analysis, but we will never know without serious research 
that carefully determines the limits and potential of this new 
analytical model. 
Moreover, lack of understanding about the budget-outcome 
relationship is not a problem only in times of austerity. Consider, 
for example, how little basis there would be for knowing how to 
expend an agency budget wisely and effectively in times of abun-
dance. Whether cutting or expanding agency budgets, the ana-
lytical exercise is much the same. 
As a thought experiment, if you were given control of an ad-
ditional one billion dollars to spend on environmental protection 
over the next five years and instructed to maximize the environ-
mental quality improvement return on the dollar, where would 
you invest? At a minimum, you would need to determine which 
expenditures would provide the greatest marginal yield of envi-
ronmental quality, and you would also need a means to assess 
the effectiveness of your expenditures. These are the very same 
challenges you would face if cutting the budget by one billion 
dollars. 
In this Part, we first identify the key questions that need to 
be asked for both such challenges—good budget times and bad—
and then set out the most important analytical tasks needed for 
providing the answers. Taken together, these lay the core foun-
dation for both a research agenda and strategy directed at un-
derstanding the relationship between agency budgets and out-
comes. Greater knowledge of this relationship can guide 
 
 133. See, e.g., Hope Yen, Trump’s Pick for Budget Director Has Urged Big 
Spending Cuts, YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 17, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ 
trumps-pick-budget-director-urged-big-spending-cuts-191116373—finance 
.html. 
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questions and decisions regarding institutional design, policy in-
strument choice, federalism, and reliance on private governance. 
While we use EPA as the illustrative case, our insights are 
equally relevant for other regulatory agencies. 
A. ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 
1. How should the budget be distributed among institutions? 
Since EPA is not the only player in the environmental pro-
tection game and the government has a finite amount of money 
dedicated to environmental protection, the threshold question is 
how to distribute investments between federal programs, state 
and local programs, environmental NGOs, private sector indus-
try, and other actors. It may very well be the case that support-
ing compliance training in private-sector industrial facilities 
would yield a greater return than investing the same amount in 
EPA’s facility inspection program.134 Investing in urban land 
trusts to secure ecosystem services, such as water filtration and 
groundwater recharge, could be more efficient at producing those 
benefits than imposing tighter federal regulation of development 
in wetlands.135 Or perhaps the low-hanging fruit lies in state 
programs facing even more austerity than EPA. Dollar for dollar, 
beefing up state resources might make more of a difference to 
environmental quality. 
2. How should the budget be allocated within the agency so as 
to pursue the optimal mix of intermediate products? 
Once EPA’s budget is set, what should you instruct EPA to 
do with the newfound money to maximize environmental qual-
ity? Would restoring programs that experienced the greatest 
budget cuts in the past provide the best return on the dollar? Our 
findings suggest not, at least for air quality—those cuts do not 
appear to have prevented reductions in emissions. So, which in-
termediate products that EPA produces should receive the new 
 
 134. See Sarah L. Stafford, Private Policing of Environmental Performance: 
Does It Further Public Goals?, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 75 (2012) (noting 
that “private organizations often have better access to certain information” and 
“generally make decisions more quickly and with less red tape than public agen-
cies”). 
 135. See, e.g., James Salzman, Lecture, What Is the Emperor Wearing? The 
Secret Lives of Ecosystem Services, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 591, 593 (2011) 
(pointing out how investments in “natural capital” can be more effective than 
ones in “built capital”). 
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money? Maybe it would be most effective for EPA to experiment 
with producing new intermediate products. Again, there is vir-
tually no quantitative empirical foundation on which to base 
these decisions.136 
3. How should the budget be allocated to ensure resilience? 
Resilience is a special kind of intermediate product meriting 
its own consideration. We have little understanding of the extent 
to which past decades of austerity may have deteriorated the re-
silience of EPA and other state and local agencies. It may be that 
marginal budget changes initially have little effect on environ-
mental protection because the system is resting in equilibrium. 
If funding is reduced below a certain level, though, the equilib-
rium could shift into catastrophic failure through a combination 
of loss of credibility, key personnel, or respect for the rule of law. 
Many of the narratives about the drinking-water crisis in Flint, 
Michigan, for example, have pointed the finger at underfunded 
environmental agencies.137 This was, they charge, a tragedy 
waiting to happen.138 The large-scale governmental failure in 
the Flint drinking-water crisis may be a one-off anomaly, or it 
could be evidence of cracks building in the public governance in-
frastructure.139  Are we close to a tipping point with EPA and 
other federal and state public governance institutions? Does 
Terry Anderson’s chart take a drastic turn for the worse or do 
the lines keep diverging? Again, we do not know.  
4. How should budget yield be measured? 
The regulatory state, and environmental policy in particu-
lar, has relied heavily on the development of tools such as cost-
benefit analysis and risk assessment to evaluate the merits of 
regulatory initiatives, such as a rule lowering particulate emis-
 
 136. Comparatively speaking, air quality is one of the areas of environmen-
tal quality where the available data are comparatively good. Yet, as the analysis 
in Part IV brings out, even their data are sparse and the prospects for valuable 
empirical investigation are quite limited. 
 137. See, e.g., Lenny Bernstein & Brady Dennis, Flint’s Water Crisis Reveals 
Government Failures at Every Level, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2016), http://wpo.st/ 
4A8Q2. 
 138. See, e.g., id. 
 139. See id. 
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sions. Indeed, in some cases cost-benefit analysis can be the driv-
ing factor in determining the structure of a new regulation.140 
 Neither of these tools, though, can usefully guide budget al-
location decisions. That requires a marginal analysis between 
dollars invested and environmental-quality results—calculating 
the impact on environmental quality from an incremental in-
vestment in a particular institution’s budget. To understand the 
marginal impact on environmental quality of raising or cutting 
the EPA’s (or any other institution’s) budget, we need different 
tools. Otherwise we are left trying to drive a nail with a spoon. 
B. DESIGNING THE RESEARCH AGENDA 
The difficulty of providing answers to the questions we have 
just identified should suggest caution. The production function 
of regulatory agencies is truly complex, with significant con-
founding factors. This explains in large part why our literature 
search uncovered such scant scholarship on the topic. Nonethe-
less, the questions set out above are of the first importance for 
law and policy. Seeking to answer them, even at a preliminary 
level, will require an interdisciplinary research effort among 
lawyers, economists, political scientists, and the environmental 
science disciplines. Despite the difficulty, the research task is 
well worth undertaking and long overdue. 
The questions we asked in the previous section form, in es-
sence, a sequential decision tree for determining budgets: (1) de-
cide how monies should be distributed among agencies; (2) than 
distributed within agencies; (3) how to ensure resilience; and (4) 
how to measure the yield of budgeting decisions to assess 
whether we received value for money. In most instances, we can-
not currently answer these questions for any agency. To do so in 
the future will require a focused research agenda. We set this 
out in the following subsections, in the reverse order from that 
set out in Part V.A.141 
 
 140. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217–18 
(2009) (upholding EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis in determining Clean Wa-
ter Act national performance standards). 
 141. We note that an initial question would typically call for the determina-
tion of what goal(s) an agency should pursue. Depending on the agency and 
what the agency is charged to do, that question may be hard to answer. See 
supra note 117 (citing to literature noting the difficulties in identifying such 
goals for competition agencies). In the case of EPA and similar environmental 
protection agencies, we think it clear that environmental quality in some form 
is the ultimate goal, although we hasten to add that subsidiary issues remain, 
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1. Developing Methods and Models to Assess Budget Yield 
a. Marginal Returns Analysis Methods 
As described above, cost-benefit analysis in the modern reg-
ulatory state is focused on the net social outcome of intermediate 
products. Our concern, by contrast, focuses on how to allocate 
institutional budget investments or cuts to most efficiently pro-
duce regulatory agency bang for the buck (whether environmen-
tal quality, health outcomes, or student learning—depending on 
the agency’s mandate). In times of austerity and budget cuts, or 
in times of abundance, aggregate cost-benefit analysis alone can-
not inform decisions about where to cut or invest the next budget 
dollar. 
This is not to suggest that aggregate cost-benefit analysis is 
useless. It provides valuable insights and information about the 
total social costs and benefits flowing from a specific environ-
mental-protection measure, such as a particulate emission 
standard, and informs the return on investment from the meas-
ure. It may shed light on whether a proposed measure is worth 
undertaking, but does not inform decisions to invest among in-
termediate products—that is, whether marginal increases 
should go to regulation, enforcement, education, industry train-
ing, or a different institution altogether.142 
 
such as the precise measures of environmental quality (including how the issue 
is framed) and questions of how environmental degradation is distributed. See, 
e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1353 (1985) (lauding tradable pollution-permit regimes 
over command-and-control regimes to achieve environmental goals, on the 
ground that the former vest the important decision of how much overall pollu-
tion should be allowed with the legislature, thus enhancing democracy); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 636 (same); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949, 
967 (1991) (same); Nash & Revesz, supra note 81, at 579–80 (discussing the 
relationship between dispersion of pollutants and environmental justice con-
cerns). 
 142. To analyze budget cutting, we would need to assess the impact on envi-
ronmental quality from a one percent budget cut versus a five percent budget 
cut. Knowing that the total social costs of a program on the chopping block are 
X and the total social benefits are Y will not answer these questions, except in 
the unlikely case in which the return on budget investment is constant across 
the entire production function from the first budget dollar to any sized budget. 
For example, if an EPA enforcement program were shown to have aggregate 
social benefits twice those of social costs, this would be a positive sign about the 
program’s overall effectiveness. But this would not necessarily mean that in-
vesting more in the agency’s enforcement program budget is a good decision. It 
is entirely possible that most of the environmental quality gains could have been 
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Federal and state agencies collect mountains of data on en-
vironmental quality and conduct comprehensive cost-benefit 
analyses,143 but almost never consider marginal return on the 
dollar. This type of analysis is commonplace in private organiza-
tions but is exceedingly rare in the public sector. That needs to 
change, and will require developing a more robust production 
function. It may be possible, for example, to extend the kind of 
empirical inquiry we have started to derive more granular data 
about budget returns. For example, comparing the historical 
budgets of multiple state water- or air-quality programs against 
movements in relative environmental-quality indicators could 
begin to provide more insight than is possible in a single-
agency/single-medium study like ours. 
History provides a useful guide. Sophisticated cost-benefit 
analysis is now a routine part of administrative decision-mak-
ing. But this is a fairly recent development. The method was 
originally developed in the 1930s to assess water infrastructure 
projects by the Army Corps of Engineers.144 Its use expanded in 
the 1970s with President Nixon’s quality of life reviews,145 Pres-
ident Ford’s requirement that agencies produce inflation impact 
statements,146 and President Carter’s Executive Order (EO) 
12044.147 The methodology became firmly implanted in regula-
tory processes when President Clinton initiated the regulatory 
impact review (RIA) process in 1993 with his Executive Order 
 
secured with a smaller budget investment in the first place and adding more 
money yields little additional gain. Conversely, if the program were shown to 
have costs twice those of benefits, this would not necessarily mean the pro-
gram’s budget should not be reduced, as scaling back to a smaller program 
budget could continue to produce most of the environmental quality benefits 
and improve its cost-benefit profile. 
 143. See, e.g., Air Data: Air Quality Data Collected at Outdoor Monitors 
Across the US, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/outdoor-air-quality-data (last updated 
July 18, 2017) (containing an extensive amount of data). 
 144. See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, Reagan Order on Cost-Benefit Analysis Stirs 
Economic and Political Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1981, at 28 (discussing how 
the Army Corps of Engineers has used cost-benefit analysis for many years). 
 145. See Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 
65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1248 (1987). 
 146. See id. 
 147. Stuart Shapiro, The Evolution of Cost-Benefit Analysis in U.S. Regula-
tory Decisionmaking 3 (Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance, Work-
ing Paper No. 5, 2010), http://regulation.huji.ac.il/papers/jp5.pdf (“[The Execu-
tive Order] required an economic analysis for any regulation with a likely 
impact of more than $100 million. Agencies were required to choose ‘the least 
burdensome of acceptable alternatives.’”). 
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12,866.148 That executive order required that, when proposing a 
“significant regulatory action,” which includes regulations hav-
ing an impact on the economy of more than $100 million,149 
“[e]ach agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the 
intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and bene-
fits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only 
upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended 
regulation justify its costs.”150 EO 12,866 also established within 
OMB the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) as 
the entity responsible for overseeing the RIA process.151 OIRA 
has over time issued a number of guidance documents for agen-
cies engaging in RIAs. At present the RIA process is governed by 
Circular A-4, which OIRA first issued in 2003.152 
The key point is that the methodology developed for as-
sessing dams and levees would have proven woefully inadequate 
in analyzing health or safety regulations. Yet cost-benefit anal-
ysis over the years has become increasingly sophisticated, such 
that today it is routinely used in these settings and many others. 
The same, we emphasize, can be done for the regulatory produc-
tion function. Where to start? One of the limitations of our em-
pirical study was the lack of consistent historical data that we 
could use for regressions against environmental-quality 
measures. It would be useful, therefore, if agencies and other in-
stitutions began compiling more comprehensive and granular 
accounts of budget investments over time. As program budgets 
scale up, are cut, or stay flat, agencies should monitor relevant 
environmental-quality indicators and conduct analyses like 
ours. And as institutions design new intermediate products, per-
haps by leveraging emerging technologies such as big data or 
machine learning, research should be conducted from inception 
 
 148. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), https:// 
www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf. Presi-
dent Clinton’s order replaced several orders President Reagan had issued re-
garding the use of cost-benefit analysis in federal agency rulemakings. Id. § 11. 
President Reagan’s orders, although influential and controversial at the time, 
are no longer in effect and provide none of the legal authority for the modern 
RIA process. 
 149. Id. § 2(f ). 
 150. Id. § 1(b)(6). 
 151. Id. § 2(b). 
 152. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 (Sept. 17, 2003), http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (refin-
ing the previous “best practices” RIA guide). 
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to track its costs and to detect shifts in the relevant environmen-
tal-quality metrics. Better yet, experiments could be conducted 
to provide a more controlled research environment. For example, 
inspections at water polluting facilities could be boosted in one 
watershed compared to another similar watershed and changes 
in water quality measured. 
The work of James Hamilton and Kip Viscusi is instructive 
in this regard. Hamilton and Viscusi critiqued EPA’s approach 
of requiring hazardous-waste sites to be cleaned to allow for all 
possible future uses.153 Instead, they argued that the standard 
to which such sites should be clean should take into account only 
likely future uses.154 In other words, it was error for the agency 
not to consider the marginal return on the funds invested in 
cleanups.  
In short, our message is to begin tracking the data necessary 
to refine our understanding of the marginal returns to the 
agency’s goal from investments in budgets of different institu-
tions and their intermediate products. Of course, designing such 
research can be challenging and resource intensive: the baseline 
must be established, other possible factors such as pollutant 
transport and economic fluctuations accounted for, and condi-
tions carefully monitored and measured. Different lag times be-
tween budget investment and changes in the measure of the 
agency goal will complicate assessment of any one program and 
comparisons across programs. And the ultimate conundrum is 
that, particularly in times of austerity and budget cuts, new 
budgets for this kind of research—indeed, even for generating 
and collecting new data—could be hard to come by. But even 
those in favor of cutting budgets ought to appreciate the benefits 
of funding research to inform which budgets to cut and by how 
much! The point, however, is that no research of this kind is be-
ing conducted at all, at least none that has been reported. Just 
as happened with cost-benefit analysis, these tools need to be 
 
 153. See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assess-
ments for Superfund, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573, 608–10 (1994) (critiquing EPA’s 
policy of requiring cleanup of Superfund sites based on all possible future uses 
of sites rather than eliminating future risks by imposing land use restrictions 
and containment). 
 154. See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of 
Regulatory Reforms for Superfund, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 167–71 (1997) 
(arguing in favor of determining appropriate Superfund remediation strategies 
based upon cost-benefit analysis of sites that would focus on health risk contin-
ued contamination would pose to current residents). 
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developed from a rudimentary starting point if there is to be any 
meaningful traction on the higher-level questions that follow. 
b. Complex Adaptive System Models 
Looking to the future, we believe that an advanced regula-
tory production function could be further refined by complexity 
science. The focus of complexity science is complex adaptive sys-
tems, “in which large networks of components with no central 
control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collec-
tive behavior, sophisticated information processing, and adapta-
tion via learning or evolution.”155 Complexity scientists are par-
ticularly interested in studying how robust a complex adaptive 
system is to external disturbances.156 How will a forest ecosys-
tem respond to an invasive insect species? How will a transpor-
tation network respond to adding or removing a component, such 
as a highway or bridge? 
Complex adaptive systems tend to exhibit extensive path-
ways of nonlinear behavior, making prediction of perturbation 
impacts no easy task, but it must be a focus of study for policy-
relevant systems if we hope to competently manage them. One 
focus of complexity science is the study of systemic risk, which 
can lead to local or global cascading failures.157 Complexity sci-
ence is influential across an array of social science disciplines, 
 
 155. MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 13 (2009). “Complex 
adaptive system” is used to distinguish between complex systems that are 
highly adaptive (e.g., an ecosystem) versus nonadaptive (e.g., a hurricane). 
 156. See LANCE H. GUNDERSON & C.S. HOLLING, PANARCHY: UNDERSTAND-
ING TRANSFORMATION IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 25–63 (2002). 
 157. See J.B. Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk in Legal Systems, 89 IND. L.J. 
559, 562–63 (2014) (describing systemic risks and their cascading failures). 
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including economics,158 political science,159 sociology,160 and in-
ternational affairs.161 It also has been applied in the study of a 
 
 158. See, e.g., ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, 
COMPLEXITY, AND THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 289–91 (Hollis 
Heimbouch ed., 2006) (describing how local dynamics and interactions between 
agents throughout business hierarchies will result in larger actions in the phys-
ical world relating to budgets, products, and marketing); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE 
SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY 32 (1996) (“Phase space representations of dy-
namic systems are extremely common modern economic analysis.”); Didier Sor-
nette & Ryan Woodard, Financial Bubbles, Real Estate Bubbles, Derivative Bub-
bles, and the Financial and Economic Crisis, in ECONOPHYSICS APPROACHES TO 
LARGE-SCALE BUSINESS DATA AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 101, 138 (Misako Taka-
yasu et al. eds., 2010) (stating that the cause of financial crises is the interaction 
and mutual reinforcement of multiple economic bubbles); Neil Johnson & 
Thomas Lux, Financial Systems: Ecology and Economics, 469 NATURE 302, 303 
(2011) (criticizing a model which focuses on individual optimization because it 
ignores complex interactions and fails to consider systemic risk factors). 
 159. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: 
AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 148–51 (Philip 
W. Anderson et al. eds., 1997) (utilizing complexity science to understand how 
nations and cultures emerge); ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY 
IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 266–72 (1997) (describing the Domino Theory 
Paradox, in which small domestic defeats can generate widespread policy impli-
cations and impact the global perception of a country); SCOTT DE MARCHI, COM-
PUTATIONAL AND MATHEMATICAL MODELING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 156–64 
(2005) (framing encoding preferences as adaptive landscapes to represent ag-
gregated voting preferences); Michael J. Ensley et al., District Complexity as an 
Advantage in Congressional Elections, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 990, 996–98 (2009) 
(determining that the unpredictable nature of complex districts benefits incum-
bents by deterring challengers from entering); Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 
1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87, 103–05 (2006) (suggesting that voting processes today are 
dependent upon the processes and paths of early and recent history). 
 160. See, e.g., R. KEITH SAWYER, SOCIAL EMERGENCE: SOCIETIES AS COM-
PLEX SYSTEMS 3–4 (2005) (using the process of language shift to demonstrate 
how simple rules and interactions at the local level can give rise to collective 
behavior); Elizabeth E. Bruch & Robert D. Mare, Neighborhood Choice and 
Neighborhood Change, 112 AM. J. SOC. 667, 669–70 (2006) (examining neigh-
borhood segregation with complexity science to demonstrate that “aggregate 
outcomes may be quite sensitive to . . . assumptions at the micro level”); Elinor 
Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PER-
SPECTIVES 137, 153 (2000) (stating that external threats such as migration and 
market changes will impact the norms of trust and reciprocity in self-organized 
regimes). 
 161. See, e.g., WALTER C. CLEMENS JR., COMPLEXITY SCIENCE AND WORLD 
AFFAIRS 71–72 (2013) (applying insights from complexity science to understand 
the divergent outcomes of successor states following the collapse of communist 
regimes across Eurasia); Robert Axelrod, The Dissemination of Culture: A Model 
with Local Convergence and Global Polarization, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 203, 
207–11 (1997) (utilizing complexity science to explain the development of cul-
tural regions); Lars-Erik Cederman, Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard 
Balls to Sandpiles, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 135, 144–45 (2003) (identifying con-
flict-generating factors within complex systems that can lead to war). 
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wide variety of policy challenges such as terrorist networks,162 
organized crime,163 transportation systems,164 urban growth,165 
and national security.166 
One of the systems most relevant to EPA’s mission—the en-
vironment—is also widely recognized and studied as a complex 
adaptive system.167 Understanding how subjecting an environ-
ment to more pollution or more land development—which, in es-
 
 162. See, e.g., E. Ahmed et al., On Complex Adaptive Systems and Terrorism, 
337 PHYSICS LETTERS A 127, 127 (2005) (applying aspects of complex adaptive 
systems to terrorism to determine that the complete eradication of terrorism is 
“highly unlikely”); Antoine Bousquet, Complexity Theory and the War on Terror: 
Understanding the Self-Organising Dynamics of Leaderless Jihad, 15 J. INT’L 
REL. & DEV. 345, 360–61 (2012) (explaining that a decentralized, bottom-up 
structure allows terrorist networks to better plan and execute complex opera-
tions such as September 11); Vito Latora & Massimo Marchiori, How the Science 
of Complex Networks Can Help Developing Strategies Against Terrorism, 20 
CHAOS, SOLITONS & FRACTALS 69, 73–74 (2004) (demonstrating how complex 
systems science may be used to disrupt terrorism by identifying “critical com-
ponents” in the terrorist network). 
 163. See, e.g., Paul A. C. Duijn et al., The Relative Ineffectiveness of Criminal 
Network Disruption, in 4 SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 1, 1–2 (2014), https://www 
.nature.com/articles/srep04238.pdf (describing criminal networks as complex 
adaptive systems and identifying strategies to disrupt these networks). 
 164. See, e.g., A. Aw & M. Rascle, Resurrection of “Second Order” Models of 
Traffic Flow, 60 SIAM J. APPLIED MATHEMATICS 916, 931–33 (2000) (examining 
the effects of perturbations on the stability of traffic flow); Debashish Chow-
dhury et al., Statistical Physics of Vehicular Traffic and Some Related Systems, 
329 PHYSICS REP. 199, 213 (2000) (stating that the “unsystematic” behavior of 
traffic is a reflection of the dynamics of the vehicles in a traffic jam); Petter 
Holme, Congestion and Centrality in Traffic Flow on Complex Networks, 6 AD-
VANCES COMPLEX SYSTEMS 163, 174 (2003) (stating that when estimating traf-
fic congestion in one region, one must also consider aspects of the neighboring 
regions); Bosiljka Tadić et al., Traffic on Complex Networks: Towards Under-
standing Global Statistical Properties from Microscopic Density Fluctuations, 
69 PHYSICAL REV. E 036102-1, 036102-4 (2004) (stating that “[t]here is a robust-
ness in the [traffic] system in the sense that minor changes to the query disci-
pline or buffer sizes do not lead to a qualitative difference”); Bosiljka Tadić et 
al., Transport on Complex Networks: Flow, Jamming and Optimization, 17 
INT’L J. BIFURCATION & CHAOS 2363, 2374–77 (2007) (identifying underlying 
indicators that give rise to complex inefficiencies in the system). 
 165. See, e.g., Robert H. Samet et al., Complexity, the Science of Cities and 
Long-Range Futures, 47 FUTURES 49, 56–57 (2013). 
 166. See, e.g., Jürgen Scheffran, The Complexity of Security, 14 COMPLEXITY 
13, 15–17 (2008). 
 167. SIMON LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION: COMPLEXITY AND THE COMMONS 12–
15 (1999) (describing the features of a complex adaptive system and how those 
are illustrated in ecosystems). 
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sence, are external perturbations—necessarily implicates com-
plex adaptive systems analysis.168 The regulatory production 
function can be usefully analyzed as a complex adaptive system, 
as well. The description of the regulatory production function in 
Part III certainly maps well onto the complex adaptive systems 
model: (1) a diverse network of interconnected actors is in mo-
tion; (2) no single central control mechanism dictates system be-
havior; (3) how any intermediate product performs depends on a 
multitude of factors both internal and external to the defined 
system; and (4) over time the system adapts and evolves. Budget 
cuts (or increases) are, in a very real sense, perturbations to this 
system. 
Hence it would be incomplete to use complexity science to 
improve our understanding of only one of the coupled systems in 
the budget-outcomes analysis—the environment—while treat-
ing the regulatory production function as some form of nonlinear 
system subject to study exclusively through conventional statis-
tical computation methods.169 Indeed, legal scholars have begun 
to employ complexity science as one lens through which to probe 
descriptive and normative questions about legal system com-
plexity.170 Legal complexity theorists have focused on mapping 
the legal system’s complexity by examining how each attribute 
of complex adaptive systems described in complexity science re-
search finds close parallel in legal system structure and behav-
ior. There have been numerous such accounts of how complex 
adaptive system attributes appear in a broad range of legal sys-
tems including administrative law,171 mediation and alternative 
 
 168. Simon A. Levin et al., Social-Ecological Systems as Complex Adaptive 
Systems: Modeling and Policy Implications, 18 ENV’T. & DEV. ECON. 111, 113–
14 (2013). 
 169. J.B. Ruhl, Daniel Martin Katz & Michael J. Bommarito II, Harnessing 
Legal Complexity, 355 SCIENCE 1377, 1377 (2017). 
 170. For an overview of complexity science and how scholars in the social 
sciences, including law, have integrated it, see J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A 
Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2008). 
 171. See Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Admin-
istrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913 (2005). 
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dispute resolution,172 bankruptcy law,173 environmental law,174 
business law,175 international law,176 land-use regulation law,177 
intellectual property law,178 international development law,179 
regulation of the internet,180 the law of war,181 health law,182 and 
telecommunications regulation.183 
Of course, the regulatory agency budget-outcomes produc-
tion function model encompasses more than just a legal system. 
Its law component is embedded within a larger system involving 
politics, the economy, and the environment, all of which also 
could be described as complex adaptive systems. Researchers 
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595 (2013). 
 182. See M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. 
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from a broad variety of fields increasingly are exploring how 
these systems of systems policy challenges can be better under-
stood through complexity science models. For example, the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences recently described the diverse eco-
nomic, physical, social, and policy dynamics that drive the vast 
conglomerate food system as a complex adaptive system,184 and 
financial policy researchers have proposed using complexity sci-
ence models to better design policy responses to systemic risk in 
the financial system.185 
Following those leads, we believe it would be useful, even in 
the early stages of empirical research, to view the budget-out-
comes dynamic through the lens of complexity science and to 
think of budget cuts (or increases) as external perturbations. 
While we are not currently able to build out a complete system 
model, our point is that the goal should be to develop this kind 
of deeper understanding of the system and initiate a research 
agenda with that goal in mind. Just as with improving marginal 
analysis methodologies, complexity systems models will require 
more robust datasets regarding public and private regulatory in-
vestments and the outcomes those investments are intended to 
produce. Given the substantial advancements in data collection, 
management, and analytics that have been made in the last dec-
ade, progress seems likely to continue. 
2. Assessing and Maintaining Resilience 
In addition to modeling and measuring budget yield, one 
particular intermediate product—resilience—warrants special 
attention because it raises different analytic challenges. 
 Investment in maintaining resilience of infrastructure—
whether highway bridges or a metro system or public govern-
ance—rarely provides an obvious and immediate return on the 
dollar, but failing to invest will eventually take its toll. Collapse 
can be nonlinear—a function of systemic risk reaching the break-
ing point—and repair efforts might come too late to avoid a cas-
 
 184. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A FRAMEWORK FOR AS-
SESSING EFFECTS OF THE FOOD SYSTEM 6–7 (Malden C. Nesheim et al. eds., 
2015). 
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cade of failure. The bridge may work fine until it collapses. Re-
silience thus is a complex adaptive system’s front-line defense 
against system failure.186 
From this vantage, both Terry Anderson and the environ-
mental groups decrying budget cuts could be correct. It may be 
the case that reduced agency funding has little direct correlation 
to measures of environmental quality but a close correlation to 
individual pollution disasters. 
Since the early 2000s, there has been an explosion of theory 
and research on the theme of organizational resilience in the 
business enterprise context.187 There has also been a rising in-
terest in agencies like EPA on how they can promote resilience 
in environmental quality.188 Only recently, however, has the re-
silience goal been directed at public agencies themselves—how 
to make and keep them resilient.189 Notwithstanding privatiza-
tion rhetoric, the public quickly turns to agencies like EPA, and 
not generally to the private sector, to (1) protect against failures 
like the Flint drinking-water crisis; and (2) respond when they 
occur with return on the dollar not the primary concern. Further 
research is needed on what supports and sustains regulatory 
agency resilience. In particular, there must be greater focus on 
calculating the baseline investments needed to ensure resilience 
as well as ways to assess this measure within agencies. This is a 
nascent field but with important research payoffs. 
3. Evaluating and Comparing Intermediate Products 
A key feature of the regulatory production function will be 
the assessment of intermediate products—specifically, identify-
ing which intermediate goods are most important to environ-
mental quality. From a historical perspective, there may be 
much to learn from EPA’s strategic response to congressional 
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zero-budgeting strategies. In order to maintain agency effective-
ness, which activities were protected and which felt the brunt of 
budget cuts? The converse of this analysis is worth considering, 
as well. Which aspects of environmental quality are most at risk 
from which types of reduced EPA activity, and which are less 
vulnerable to backsliding? 
Part of this research would focus on those agency products 
that most depend on nonsubstitutable options. In other words, 
certain agency resources can be substituted with private or mar-
ket resources in periods of austerity (such as agency enforcement 
by citizen suits), while others cannot as easily (such as regula-
tion development). Likewise, for substitutable intermediate 
products, which option is most effective? 
Once again, data will be critical. With access to more data 
comes the possibility of more focused and calibrated statistical 
analyses. Ideally, for example, one might deploy two regressions: 
one to measure how funding (as an input) affects generation of 
an intermediate product, and a second to measure how units of 
the intermediate product affects the ultimate policy goal. The 
full analysis would shed light on how funding—as filtered 
through the chosen intermediate product—affects the ultimate 
policy goal.190 
While we have argued that greater accumulation and anal-
ysis of quantitative data would help answer these questions, re-
searchers might find qualitative analysis useful as well. As de-
scribed above, agency officials over time have likely developed 
strategies for responding to budget changes, and been forced to 
do so when faced with budget cuts. Even if these strategies are 
based on anecdotal evidence, it would be helpful to know how 
agencies in fact make these decisions under conditions of limited 
access to data.  
4. Allocating Among Institutional Actors 
The preceding research projects have focused primarily on 
the agency. Congress, too, would benefit from a more developed 
regulatory production function. There is a great deal of scholar-
ship on specific policies of institutions, whether cap-and-trade, 
product certification, taxes, et cetera, as well as case studies of 
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their application.191 There has been remarkably little considera-
tion, though, over how to allocate among the institutional actors 
undertaking these initiatives. Which institution does a better job 
at production? 
Armed with a better handle on which intermediate products 
provide the best return and which institutions are most capable 
and efficient at producing them, macro-level research could 
begin to focus on broader comparisons of overall institutional 
performance over time. We anticipate that there remain today 
many high-yield options that represent low-hanging fruit. For 
example, the EPA might be more efficient at providing educa-
tional materials, but industry more efficient at providing train-
ing. 
Private governance initiatives, such as contractual supply-
chain control,192 are relatively new, but can yield significant 
gains in environmental quality. We have learned a lot about the 
private certification of forest products and which programs are 
more effective than others, for example,193 but we still know lit-
tle about the appropriate balance between private certification 
programs and public regulation of forests. Research could be de-
voted to identifying such opportunities and tracking investment 
and returns. 
Over time, of course, as an institution’s low-hanging fruit is 
picked off, the overall marginal yield of further investment in 
that institution should fall and eventually level off. Indeed, this 
may be precisely what has happened with EPA—why its budget 
and environmental quality do not appear correlated in any sig-
nificant way. It may be that over time different institutions level 
off at different marginal yields, which could help guide invest-
ment decisions going forward. Institutions with persistently 
lower marginal yields could then begin experimentation with 
new, innovative intermediate products and production methods 
which, if they produce high marginal yields, would be a focal 
point for new budget investment. Research as to which institu-
tional actors have the best innovation track record can support 
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that investment decision as well. Again, cost-benefit analysis 
cannot produce the information needed to guide these kinds of 
decisions. This is not easily done, to be sure, but of fundamental 
importance in a world of scarce resources. 
  CONCLUSION   
While difficult to study, the relationship between regulatory 
agency funding and regulatory benefit outcomes is a research 
area of fundamental importance, raising questions that bear on 
major issues of public debate and regulatory design. Im-
portantly, while our focus has been on the environment, our 
larger point holds true for any agency whose mission centers on 
improvement of social welfare. Developing methods to measure 
budget yield, assessing and maintaining resilience, evaluating 
and comparing intermediate products, and allocating between 
institutional actors are no less relevant for OSHA, the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Department of Health and 
Human Services, as for EPA. This Article’s exploration of the is-
sues and promising research topics provides a foundation upon 
which future scholarship can build. 
